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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that a number of characteristics of trial participants (extralegal 
variables) can and do influence juror's judgements. This is of importance as only the legally 
relevant facts of the case should be considered during a trial. The present study investigates 
the influence of victim characteristics on the juror decision making process during 
deliberation and the judgements made about the victim, crime and defendant in a mock jury 
setting, as well as investigating mock juror gender differences. A representative sample of 
people eligible for jury duty in Western Australia viewed a video vignette depicting a trial, in 
which the mental disorder label (no label, schizophrenia, depression, intellectual disability) 
was varied. Deliberations were videotaped and subject to an analysis in conjunction with pre 
and post test questionnaire measuring victim characteristics. A 4x2x2 repeated measures 
ANOV A was used to analyse the data, in addition to the analysis of the deliberations. The 
qualitative findings suggest that mock jurors invested relatively much time in some mental 
disorder labels may function as extralegal variables. This inference is supported by the 
quantitative findings in this study. The mental disorder label assigned to the victim had an 
impact on mock jurors' perception of the likeability, reliability and honesty of the victim, the 
responsibility for the crime and the guilt of the defendant, often interacting with mock juror 
gender and deliberation. However, no clear pattern of bias against or in favour of any specific 
victim could be discerned. There was slightly more evidence of a negative bias than a 
positive bias towards the no label and schizophrenia victims, while the opposite was true for 
the depression and intellectual disability victims. 
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Introduction 
In recent times members of the general public have indicated that they are 
unhappy with the workings of the justice system (Findley, Odgers, & Yea, 1999). The 
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia (1997), found that some people 
believe that the trial procedures and outcomes are biased and work against them. 
Finding ways of improving the justice system has therefore become a research 
question of importance and numerous studies have investigated different aspects of 
this issue (see for example, Berman & Cutler, 1996; Bornstein, 1999; Kerr, Hymes, 
Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995). 
One of the areas that keeps on attracting the attention of researchers is juror 
decision making (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001 ). In their 
excellent review of the juror decision making research which has been conducted over 
the past 50 years, Devine and his colleagues distinguished between the following 
areas of research: first, research on procedural characteristics that focus on 
institutional parameters for jury functioning such as jury size or instructions; 
secondly, case characteristics that correspond to variables relating to specific trials, 
for example, strength of the evidence and the specific charges; thirdly, deliberation 
characteristics, which refer to all aspects of juror interaction such as interpersonal 
influence and participation or the content of discussion; and finally participant 
characteristics that they defined as individual difference variables relating to the 
jurors themselves, defendants, victims, judges and other individuals involved in the 
legal system. 
In respect of participant characteristics, a major focus of research has been the 
influence extralegal factors have on jury decision making (see for example Bagby, 
Parker, Rector, & Kalemba, 1994; Barnett & Field, 1978; Dean, Holliday-Wayne, 
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Mack, & Thomas, 2000; Erian, Lin, Patel, Neal & Geiselman, 1998; Hymes, 
Leinhart, Rowe, & Rogers, 1993; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; Stewart, 1985). 
Extralegal factors are characteristics of offenders, victims and witnesses not 
prescribed in the relevant law that influence judicial decisions, in this case juror's 
judgements (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Dane & Wrightsman, 1982; Hendry, Shaffer, & 
Peacock, 1989; Kerr et al., 1995). Examples of extralegal variables include race 
(Barnett & Field, 1978; Dean et al., 2000; Gordon, Bindrim, McNicholas & Walden, 
1988; Hymes et al., 1993; Poli, 2004; Willis, 1992), gender (Bull Kovera, McAuliff & 
Herbert, 1999; ForsterLee, Horowitz, ForsterLee, ForsterLee & McGovern, 1999; 
Guy & Edens, 2003) and attractiveness (Bagby et al., 1994; Barnett & Field, 1978; 
Erian, et al., 1998; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; Stewart, 1985). 
The literature review undertaken as part of this study, and reported in the next 
section, revealed that there were a number of problems in respect of the operation of 
extralegal factors in jury decision making. 
Very little published research was found that examined the possibility that the 
labelling of offenders, victims or witnesses as mentally disordered may act as an 
extralegal factor (see for example Walsh 1985, 1990). This is surprising because the 
prejudice by people in the community towards people suffering of mental disorders is 
well recorded (see for example Link, 1982; Martin, Pescosolido & Tuch, 2000; Reber, 
1995; Wilson, Nairn, Coverdale & Panapa, 2000; Wolff, Pathare, Craig, & Leff, 
1996). In fact a study by Henry, Keys, Balcazar, and Jopp (1996) that examined the 
attitudes of 340 staff members in community living programs for intellectually 
disabled individuals found that even they treated people with an intellectual disability 
differentially. 
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The differential treatment people suffering from a mental disorder are subject 
to is understandable if it is taken into account that jury members, lawyers, and judges, 
like all human beings, have their own cognitive schemas and stereotypes about people 
with mental disorders. These individual schemas and stereotypes lead them to react in 
different ways when confronted with an individual with a mental disorder. It therefore 
seems reasonable to assume that stereotypes and discrimination against mentally 
disordered people will inevitably be present in a courtroom. This suggests that a 
mental disorder label may function as an extralegal factor in jury decision making. 
Tentative support for the suggestion that a mental disorder label may function 
as an extralegal factor can be found in a study by Walsh (1990) who found that sex 
offenders who were labelled as having a mental disorder were twice as likely as other 
sex offenders to be incarcerated. This is especially notable because other extralegal 
variables included in the study, such as acceptance of blame, IQ, race, and socio­
economic status did not affect the decision to incarcerate, leaving mental disorder as 
the only extralegal variable that significantly affected sentencing, even after effects of 
legally relevant factors were taken into account. 
It is important to examine whether mental disorder is an extralegal variable 
because people suffering from mental disorder and disability make up a considerable 
proportion of the victims and offenders processed by the justice system (Cockram, 
Jackson, & Underwood, 1992; Holland, Clare & Mukhopadhyay, 2002). This is of 
particular importance as juries are composed of members of the community, who may 
not possess in depth knowledge about mental disorders and disabilities. Research has 
shown that even individuals who could be assumed to be more knowledgeable in this 
area may not necessarily be. This is illustrated by a study by McGillivray and 
Waterman (2003) in which lawyers' knowledge and attitudes regarding offenders with 
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intellectual disabilities were examined. Most of the lawyers surveyed had represented 
a minimum of 15 intellectually disabled clients and 57% of the participants had some 
or close social experience with intellectually disabled individuals. However, results 
indicated that although the majority of practising criminal lawyers included in the 
study did have some understanding of the problems encountered by intellectually 
disabled offenders in the criminal justice system, there were still clear deficits in their 
knowledge about the difficulties experienced by this population, ranging from need 
for support to behaviours in a court setting. 
Secondly, most of the research that has examined extralegal variables focused 
on the defendant characteristics (see for example Bagby et al., 1994; Deitz & Byrnes, 
1981; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; MacCoun, 1990). Limited research has been 
published relating to victim characteristics variables (Kerr, Bull, MacCoun, & 
Rathbom, 1985; Mulder & Winkel, 1996; Seligman, Brickman, & Koulack, 1977; 
Singleton & Hofacre, 1976) that may act as extralegal variables. There therefore 
appears to be a gap in the research in this regard because victim characteristics that 
function as extralegal variables could have an impact on both the defendant and the 
victim. 
Examining the extent to which victims' characteristics function as extralegal 
variables is also important for another reason. Research has shown that victims tend 
to under-report crimes (Marley & Buila, 1997; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1998; Violante, 
1992). This seems particularly true in the case of sexual crimes (Gartner & 
MacMillan, 1995), as this is a very intimate crime and many victims may worry that 
their personality characteristics may influence jury decision making. If the victim 
fears that he or she will be discriminated against in the justice system (Keilty & 
Connelly, 2001 ), the reporting of crimes will likely decrease even more. It is therefore 
5 
of vital importance to identify any potential discrimination against victims that may 
take place during the trial process. 
The current study aims to address the deficits identified from the literature 
review. It aims to identify whether a mental disorder label acts as an extralegal 
variable in the justice system leading to bias. Further, the study seeks to identify the 
influence of jury deliberations and gender on jury decision making and the 
measurement of bias. 
Jury deliberation was the third area of research identified by Devine et al., 
(2001). While the results are not conclusive (see for example Dillehay & Nietzel, 
1980; Tanford & Penrod, 1986; Weiten & Diamond, 1979), there is a large body of 
research that indicates that the individual opinions of jurors are notably influenced by 
jury deliberations (Izzett & Leginski, 1974; Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1983; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; McGuire & 
Bermant, 1977; Tanford & Penrod, 1986; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). It is therefore 
possible that the prejudices jurors may possess before deliberations, may be mediated 
by deliberations (London & Nunez, 2000). 
Gender is known to function as an extralegal variable (Bull et al., 1999; 
ForsterLee, et al., 1999; Guy & Edens, 2003). In an Australian study Forster Lee et 
al. (1999) found that female jurors were more likely to award higher compensation to 
sexually abused female victims, whereas male jurors awarded higher compensation to 
sexually abused male victims. Gender of the juror may be particularly important if the 
relevant offence is of a sexual nature, such as in this case where the charge was rape 
(Cowan, 2000; Fischer, 1991; Guy & Edens, 2003; Kanekar & Nazareth, 1988; 
Langley, Yost, Taylor, Frankel, & Craig, 1991; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). This is 
further illustrated by a study by Guy and Edens (2003) in which female jurors in a 
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sexually violent predator trial, judged a defendant labelled as a high risk psychopath 
more severely than they judged a defendant labelled as high risk only. Amongst the 
male jurors, however, there was no significant difference between the judgements of 
the different defendants. Cowan (2000) also found gender differences in beliefs about 
different types of rape and Wayne, Riordan, and Thomas (2001) found gender 
differences amongst jurors dealing with a sexual harassment case. 
Finally, a feature of the research carried out on extralegal variables, especially 
in respect of jury decision making, is the broad measures used for assessing possible 
bias. Most studies appear to have used either length of sentence assigned (Barnett & 
Field, 1978; DeSantis & Kayson, 1997; Dovidio et al., 1997; Erian et al., 1998; 
Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Stewart, 1985; Vito & Keil, 2000) or conviction rates of 
the defendant (Bagby et al., 1994; Dean et al., 2000; Hofacre & Singleton, 1976; 
Stewart, 1985). The problem with using such a broad measure is that it is an indirect 
measure of possible bias. In contrast, Greene and her colleagues ( e.g. Greene, 1999; 
Greene, Koehring, & Quiat, 1998) used a more sensitive measure in their work on 
victim impact statements. They distinguished between victim, crime and defendant 
variables, rather than an 'all or nothing' type of approach. 
In order to achieve the general aim of this study the following research 
questions were examined. Due to the lack of existing published research regarding the 
impact of mental disorder of the victim on jury decision making the research 
questions were exploratory in nature. 
1. Will a victim labelled as suffering from depression, intellectual disability and 
schizophrenia and those with no label of mental disorder (control group): 
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a) Be perceived by a jury to have different affective characteristics, 
specifically likeability, reliability, honesty, valuableness of victim as well 
as sympathy felt for the victim. 
b) Have a differential effect on the jury's perception of the crime in relation 
to the perceived seriousness of the crime, the impact it had on the victim 
and perceived responsibility of the victim. 
c) Have a differential effect on the jury's decision about the defendant's guilt 
and recommended sentence. 
2. Will jury deliberations change the decisions and opinions of jurors in relation to 
the victim, the defendant and the crime? 
3. Will individual juror gender influence the decisions and opinions of the jurors 
made in relation to the victim, the defendant and the crime? 
The following steps were followed to accomplish the aim of the study and are 
reported on in this study. As an initial step a comprehensive literature review was 
undertaken during which concepts crucial for the execution of the project were 
examined. The focus was on extralegal variables in general, the possible operation of 
a mental disorder label as an extralegal factor, and the effect jury deliberations and 
gender could have on a study of mental disorder as extralegal factors where the crime 
involved is a sexual offence. To ensure that the study meets sound methodological 
practice, the relevant literature was examined to identify methodological issues that 
could be relevant for a study of this nature. The next stages of the research involved 
undertaking the quantitative and qualitative components. The quantitative component 
consisted of a series of questionnaires given to the jurors for completion. The 
qualitative component consisted of the videotaping of the deliberation in order to 
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enable a greater understanding of the deliberation process and its influence on the 
jurors. The qualitative analysis of the jury deliberations was added in order to 
triangulate the qualitative findings (Patton, 2000) as it is possible that the participants 
gave socially acceptable responses when they completed the questionnaires. 
Following these steps, a discussion of the results is presented. 
For the purposes of this study, the following definitions will be used. For 
ease of expression, the term juror or jury in the study is taken to include mock juror or 
mock jury respectively. While the present study was conducted for the purposes of 
completing a thesis, it will be referred to throughout this paper as a study. 
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Literature Review 
Five pertinent issues will be examined in the course of this literature review. The 
literature review commences with an examination of the construct extralegal factors 
and their social psychological basis. It continues with an examination of whether 
mental disorder labels may act as extralegal factors and follow on with an 
examination of deliberation as a mediating variable. As the offence selected for this 
study is of a sexual nature, gender as a factor in jury research where the offence is of a 
sexual nature is considered. The literature review concludes with an examination of 
aspects of jury research methodology that are pertinent to this study. 
Extralegal Factors 
In a court case the only variables that should enter the process of determining the 
outcome of a case are legally relevant and admissible facts (Nagel, 1983). These 
include factors referred to in legislation, factual evidence about the incident, the type 
of crime and severity of the crime (Langworthy & Crum, 1996), generally referred to 
as legal variables. The use of legally relevant and admissible facts is required to 
ensure that the trial procedure is as fair to all parties as possible, to enhance the 
prospects of justice being done, and being seen to be done. 
However, research has shown that the correspondence between formal law and 
its application is far from perfect (Nagel, 1983). Research into the area of jury 
decision making has indicated that a number of variables and characteristics of the 
trial participants can, and do, influence juror's judgements (Berman & Cutler, 1996; 
Dane & Wrightsman, 1982; Giner-Sorolla, Chaiken, & Lutz, 2002; Hendry et al., 
1989; Kerr et al., 1995; Kramer, Kerr, & Carrol, 1990; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). 
These variables are called extralegal variables, as they are not legally relevant and 
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should be irrelevant to the determination of guilt in a court case (Dane & Wrightsman, 
1982). Langworthy and Crum (1996) define extralegal variables as those which are 
not described in the law as a reason for disparate processing of individuals in the 
justice system. 
Extralegal factors can result in negative or positive bias. For example, 
defendants' characteristics that act as extralegal factors that influence jury decision 
making, may act to the advantage (see for example findings of Kerr et al., 1995; 
Perez, Hosch, Ponder, & Trejo, 1993) or disadvantage (see for example findings of 
Deitz & Byrnes, 1981; Erian et al., 1998) of the defendant. However, what is to the 
advantage of defendants, may be to the disadvantage of victims, and vice versa. If 
defendants end up with lighter sentences due to some personality characteristics of 
themselves or the victims, it could be said that the victim has not received justice and 
has been discriminated against as a legally non-relevant variable came into play in the 
courtroom. Likewise, if defendants receive harsher sentences it could be argued that 
they did not have a fair trial for the same reason. 
Examples of extralegal variables include physical attractiveness (Bagby et al., 
1994; Barnett & Field, 1978; Erian, et al., 1998; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; Mazzella 
& Feingold, 1994; Stewart, 1985), race (Barnett & Field, 1978; Dean et al., 2000; 
Gordon, Bindrim, McNicholas & Walden, 1988; Hymes, Leinhart, Rowe, & Rogers, 
1993; Langworthy & Crum, 1996; Poli, 2004; Willis, 1992), defendant occupation 
(Deitz & Byrnes, 1981), gender (Bull Kovera, McAuliff & Herbert, 1999; ForsterLee, 
Horowitz, ForsterLee, ForsterLee & McGovern, 1999; Guy & Edens, 2003; Mazzella 
& Feingold, 1994), age (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994) and social economic status 
(Deitz & Byrnes, 1981; Langworthy & Crum, 1996; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). 
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It is unnecessary for the purposes of this study to review the literature in 
respect of all these extralegal variables. However, attractiveness (Efran, 1974; Erian, 
Lin, Patel, Neal, & Geiselman, 1998; MacCoun, 1990; Kanekar & Nazareth, 1988; 
Kerr et al., 1985; Deitz & Byrnes, 1981; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; Thornton & 
Ryckian, 1983) and race (Bagby, Parker Rector, & Kalemba, 1994; Barnett & Field, 
1978; Dean et al., 2000; Gordon et al., 1988; Hymes et al., 1993; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 
1991; Poli, 2004; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Willis, 1992) have been examined in 
detail in many studies throughout the years, and they are therefore used as examples 
of how personal characteristics function as extralegal variables, and appropriately 
influence juror judgements and therefore the outcome of the trial. 
In respect of physical attractiveness some research suggests that physically 
attractive defendants are less likely to be convicted than unattractive defendants 
(Bagby et al., 1994; however, for neutral findings see Stewart, 1985; Singleton & 
Hofacre, 1976). The results of a number of studies suggested that an unattractive 
defendant was more likely to receive a harsher punishment than an attractive 
defendant (Barnett & Field, 1978; Stewart, 1985), especially when the evidence was 
weak (Erian et al., 1998). These laboratory studies are supported by Downs and 
Lyons' (1991) study of the court records of 2,000 women and men who had been 
arrested for a range of less serious offences (misdemeanours) and more serious 
offences (felonies). The researchers asked police officers who had not been involved 
in the cases to rate the attractiveness of participants by looking at the photographs that 
were taken after their arrest and the results were compared with the outcomes of the 
cases. The researchers found that attractiveness had no significant effect on 
sentencing in the case of felonies. However, for the misdemeanours significant 
attractiveness effects were observed. It is likely that the seriousness of the offence 
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may also explain the different findings by Stewart (1985), Singleton and Hofacre 
(1976) and Bagby et al. (1994). 
In respect of race, Mulder and Winkel (1996) found that white victims 
displaying white non-verbal behaviour were perceived as more credible than black 
victims displaying black non-verbal behaviours. Unlike attractiveness, race appears to 
influence both conviction rates (Dean, Holliday Wayne, Mack & Thomas, 2000; 
Stewart, 1985) and the harshness of the sentence (Desantis & Kayson, 1997; Dovidio, 
Smith, Donnella & Gaertner, 1997; Stewart, 1985; Vito & Keil, 2000). A recent 
study by Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler and Moore (2002), where racial bias in a sexual 
harassment case was investigated, found that the jurors tended to favour litigants of 
their own race and that there was also a gender bias in that white male jurors 
displayed the highest rate of racial bias. 
Other studies investigating variables in the courtroom also show that race does 
have an effect on the outcome, both in relation to victims and defendants. Willis 
(1992) for example, found that black victims were perceived as less truthful in their 
account of events, as well as more responsible for the crime than white victims were. 
Mazzella and Feingold' s (1994) meta analysis of 79 studies found that jurors 
recommended harsher punishment for the defendant when the victim was white than 
when the victim was black. Finally, a study by Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) showed that 
when white juror members rated the guilt of the defendant, black defendants were 
found guiltier than white defendants, especially when the victim was white. 
While it is a concern that extralegal factors may influence the outcome of a 
court case, the reason why this happen can be explained by reference to 
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social psychological theory. The next section will examine the literature on the 
relevant theoretical principles and investigate how those principles influence jury 
decision making. 
Social cognition with special reference to schemas 
Individuals are constantly inundated with stimuli that they perceive through their 
sensory organs. However, it is impossible for people to attend to every stimulus to 
which they are exposed. They therefore use various strategies to screen and process 
stimuli to cope with the stream of impinging stimuli. The method of interest here is 
the cognitive strategies humans employ to sort, analyse, and remember information in 
order to make sense of their social environment so that they can interact with it (Fiske, 
2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These strategies are sometimes called mental shortcuts 
or heuristics (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It is well established that heuristics influence 
the way people perceive and think about themselves, other people and their social 
environment (see e.g. Brewer, 1 989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and as such they form 
part of the broader method people use to process information (Hamilton, Devine, & 
Ostrom, 1994 ). The cognitive strategies of particular interest for the purposes of this 
study are social schemata or schemas (referred to as schemas in this study). In this 
section attention will be given to defining schemas; identifying different types of 
schemas; discussing their acquisition; development; operation and use. Finally this 
theoretical framework will be applied to jury decision making. 
Definition of schemas 
Schemas are people's preconceptions and theories about the social world. As such 
they represent knowledge about a concept, including its attributes and the relations 
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among those attributes, and rules about how to use the relevant knowledge (Fiske, 
2004; Fiske & Glick, 1995; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Some schemata can be very 
detailed and elaborate, but their distinguishing feature is that they are over-simplistic 
generalisations that enable people to cope with an otherwise sensory and information 
overload. Consequently schemas tend to minimise or reduce the variability and 
complexity that can be found in, for example, a group (Judd, Ryan, & Parke, 1991). 
Types of Schemas 
As schemas represent people's organised beliefs, expectations and feelings about a 
specific domain they can be classified according to the domains they represent. Five 
of the more common types of schemas identified by Fiske and Taylor ( 1991) and 
Fiske (2004) will be discussed here: First, person or personality schemas that unite 
people's conception of the psychology of specific people with reference to their traits 
and goals; secondly self-schemas that refer to people's conception of their own traits 
and self; thirdly event schemas which involve knowledge of an event that makes up an 
episode. Event schemas may also be called scripts because they provide a blueprint 
of the sequence of the events that make up the specific episode (Eiser, Eiser, & Jones, 
1990), for example when somebody visit a general practitioner for a flu injection; 
fourthly social role schemas, which refer to individuals' expectations and 
generalisations of people in specific roles, such as a clinical psychologist; and finally, 
and the most important for this study, are social group schemas that are also referred 
to as stereotypes. Social group schemas represent people's beliefs, expectations and 
feelings about people in groups, usually a group to which they do not belong, that is 
out-groups. Social group schemas or stereotypes will be examined in greater detail 
when the application of these theoretical principles in respect of juries are discussed. 
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Acquisition and Development of Schemas 
People start forming schema as children (Leahy & Harris, 1997) and they serve as 
frameworks people use to hang and organise new knowledge from, particularly 
information about specific people, themselves, events and roles. This process carries 
on as individuals mature and are exposed to new people and situations that give them 
insight into themselves, events and roles. The acquisition and development of 
schemas can be through direct experience or based on what people read and hear from 
other people (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998). Once people have been exposed to the 
same situation more than once they start generalising about the common features of 
the experiences and developing a schema for it (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Especially 
when a schema is still in its early stages of development it will undergo rapid 
adjustments as people are exposed to new situations. During this stage people are 
usually very attentive to information that is inconsistent with the schema (Macrae, 
Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998), probably as 
they are busy developing a comprehensive schema and tend to recall discrepancies 
better because they are struggling to resolve them (Stangor & McMillan, 1992). 
However, schemas become more entrenched as people reflect on them or find 
support for their initial judgements without taking the trouble to re-examine them 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991) because it takes energy to reconstruct a schema (Fiske, 2004). 
With the exception of those cases where a lack of new information may leave 
a person's schema impoverished, schemas generally become richer, more 
complicated, organised, flexible and abstract as time goes on (Fiske, 2004). While 
they generally also become more accurate this is not always the case because for 
schema to bring predictability and effectiveness into their lives, a point can be reached 
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where people may resist changing them (Fiske & Taylor, 1991 ) .  This conservatism to 
change a well-developed schema may even persist despite disconfirming evidence. 
People may therefore either ignore such disconfirming evidence or interpret it as 
support for their schema (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979). They may also seek information that will confirm their existing beliefs, 
expectations, and hypotheses creating a closed cognitive loop (Nickerson, 1998). 
However, as people use schema to make their social interaction more 
effective, it follows that if schemas prove to be ineffective because they are wrong, 
people will be motivated to change them (Fiske, 2004). Consequently they are 
generally accurate enough for everyday use (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), but as a 
general rule a schema can never be an accurate representation of reality as it is always 
an abstract cognitive representation of reality (Allan, personal communication, 30 
June, 2004). 
Operation of Schemas 
As suggested above schemas serve an important function in human functioning as 
they give people a sense of prediction and control by helping them understand a 
situation and knowing what to do (Fiske & Taylor, 1991 ). 
Schema may therefore influence how people perceive a situation and guide 
their behaviour in that situation. Fiske (2004) explains that in practice this means that 
if people are exposed to stimuli they immediately categorise them. Social 
categorisation can be defined as the process people use to organise and simplify 
information coming from the environment so that it fits into their cognitive frame 
work, i.e. schema (Tajfel, 1978). Humans are highly practised at categorising the 
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salient features of something they are perceiving and can do so within a milli-second 
(Fiske, 2004). 
In the case of other people categorising usually this is based on visual cues 
such as race, sex, and age (Fiske, 1998). If the information resembles previous 
information represented in a schema, the full schema is activated (Fiske, 2004). This 
means that the perceiver does not only have the incoming information in his or her 
mind, but also the information captured in his or her relevant schema. 
It is important for this study to note that schemas can also be activated by a 
label, for example, "Peter is a clinical psychologist". A label can best be described as 
a set of pre-categorised stimuli, and when the label is registered by perceivers it will 
inevitably activate the relevant schema (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Neely, 1991). 
However, schemas are not always activated as their activation appears to be 
depend to some degree on the cognitive capacity of the person at the time. Research 
by Gilbert and Hixon (1991) suggest that because it takes cognitive resources to 
activate a schema, the likelihood that a stereotype will be activated is reduced when 
people are busy with cognitive tasks. Nevertheless, once activated restricted 
cognitive capacity will facilitate the application of schema (Fiske, 2004). 
Activated schema come to mind instantly and provide a perceiver with a 
database of organised prior knowledge about the specific category, whether it is a 
person, event or group, and the rules governing the situation. Consequently it 
becomes easier to interpret the incoming information, understand what is going on 
and fill in gaps that may exist in the information and to make inferences and decision 
(Fiske, 2004). 
The influence of schemas on the encoding of new information, remembering 
of old information, and responding will be discussed next. However, as much of what 
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is reported here is still the subject of research, i t  is not necessarily accepted by all 
scholars in the area. 
What information gets people 's attention. 
Schemas strongly affect the way in which people encode incoming 
information because once a schema is activated the typical characteristics associated 
with it come to mind readily (see e.g. Brewer, 1 989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1 990; Higgins 
& Bargh, 1 987). 
As new information can be fitted into an existing framework, it is easier 
and faster to encode information consistent with a schema, than information that is not 
consistent with it (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1 986; Schneider & Pressley, 1 989). 
Nevertheless, both Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths (1 993) and Sherman, Lee, 
Bessenoff, and Frost (1 998) found that this difference was not significant under 
normal circumstances. However, when people had low processing capacity they took 
longer at encoding both consistent and inconsistent information, especially 
inconsistent information (also see Stangor & McMillan, 1 992). What is notable of 
Sherman et al (1 998) study is that schema-irrelevant information was virtually 
ignored. 
Schemas also influence how people are judged. For example, when a child 
who was depicted to be from a wealthy background performed ambiguously on a test, 
she was perceived to be more able than one from a poor background (Darley & Gross, 
1 983). 
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What information is stored in the memory. 
Research suggests that when individuals process information, they tend to 
store schema relevant material (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & 
Wyer, 1985) better than irrelevant material (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Smith 
& Graesser, 1981). In the case of well-developed schema research shows that if 
people have the chance to think about relevant material afterwards, they tend to 
remember the information that was consistent with the schema (Wyer & Martin, 
1 987). For example, if a person's schema in respect of a specific race group is that 
they are unreliable, the person will tend to remember relevant information confirming 
this better than disconfirming information. In the case of recognition memory relevant 
information consistent with the schema is better recognised (Fiske, 2004). 
What information is retrieved and used. 
It is well-established that people use their schemas when, for example, they 
read material (Pritchard, 1991). Once a schema is activated the typical characteristics 
associated with it comes to mind readily (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). This is important 
because it has long been known that information presented initially has a relatively 
greater effect on impression formed than later information, the so-called primacy 
effect (Asch, 1946). People therefore give more attention to schema consistent 
information (O'Sullivan & Durso, 1 984), process such information faster (Dovidio et 
al., 1986), rehearse it more frequently, and consequently tend to remember it better 
(Bodenhausen, 1988; Judd et al., 1991) when making a judgement. 
However, while the categorisation of people is ever present and largely 
automatic (Fiske & Glick, 1995) people do seem to make a decision whether to use a 
schema or not in specific situations. Possibly because they realise that as a general 
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case a schema is never an accurate representation of reality, people seem to make a 
decision how much they will in a specific situation rely on a schema and how much 
on the evidence. The exact balance will fall somewhere on a continuum depending 
on the perceived accuracy of the schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and people's 
motivation (Fiske, 2004). 
A perceiver would therefore rely more on data when, for example, a schema is 
clearly not relevant in the situation, too extreme or when there is very clear and 
unambiguous evidence that undermines the schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Schemas 
may also be ignored where pragmatic goals outweigh the cognitive economical 
advantages of using them (Fiske & Glick, 1995). 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) and Fiske (2004) discuss a number of cases where the 
potential cost of being wrong, if a schema is relied upon, is high enough to lead 
people to rely more heavily on data. Five of the cases that are relevant will be 
discussed here, due to their relevance to this research. 
The first is where a person must form an opinion about another person who 
needs to be trusted, for example where the person will be a member of a team. 
The second is where pepole know beforehand that they will be held 
accountable for their decisions by people whose biases they do not know or who they 
believe will unbiased. Under these circumstances people become more vigilant (Janis 
& Mann, 1977) and move beyond their schema to examine the information at hand 
more carefully (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Kim, 1985). 
However, if people feel committed to a specific position they had previously taken 
they may not go beyond their schemas but may rather try to justify their position 
(Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). While accountabHity makes people more 
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vigilant about using their schemas this does not necessary make them more accurate 
(Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). 
People tend to protect their self-image and the third case where people may 
go beyond a schema is where they believe that their judgements could reflect 
negatively on a facet of their self that is significant to them (Freund, Kruglanski, & 
Shpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988). 
Therefore schemas are less influential if people believe their judgements may reflect 
negatively on decision making abilities; or will be compared to an objective standard; 
or that they would have to explain their judgement to peers; or that the decisions are 
of the utmost importance to the person who is being judged. 
The fourth situation where people may be cautious about usmg their 
schemas is, when they are in a purposeful decision making frame of mind when they 
consider their decision (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). 
Finally, people are inclined to examine information more carefully if they 
are told what the personal cost will be if they fail to take factual evidence into account 
and they are told how to move beyond their biases (Fiske, 2004). 
Nevertheless, even when these circumstances are present people may stillfast 
and.frugal heuristics. This typically happens when people are under time pressure to 
make important decisions based on a large amount of complex and ambiguous 
information (Davis & Davis, 1996; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1971; 1974). In such circumstances people tend to focus on a minimum of 
information, usually one or two factors (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). This will often mean that they 
stick to their schema and limit their search for additional information (Kruglanski, 
1989). 
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A number of explanations have been advanced to explain this situation 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Fiske, 2004). A cognitive explanation is that people may not 
have the cognitive resources to find the necessary relevant and informative data to 
make the decision under such circumstances, and consequently use schemas that are 
usually effective (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). It is also possible that physiological 
reasons may contribute to this situation in that time pressure may have a physiological 
effect that promote the use of schemas, especially stereotypes (Kim & Baron, 1988). 
Application of Theory to the Jury Situation 
From the above it is clear that all people use schemas and that they serve an 
important function in our everyday interaction with the world by simplifying and 
streamlining the perception process (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). It is therefore 
inevitable that jury members will also at times use schemas in the normal course of 
their lives. However, two factors discussed above imply that people may be able to 
check the use of schemas when they serve as jury members. First, people are less 
likely to use schemas if they are warned to consider only the relevant evidence; realise 
they will be held accountable for their decision; appreciate that the outcome of the 
decision they are making is important to somebody; or feel that their decision may 
reflect on their abilities. All of these circumstances are present in the case of jury 
decision making. Consequently is likely that jury members will usually be able to 
override their schemas and base their decisions the relevant evidence. Secondly, 
serving as a jury member requires the use of cognitive capacity. The use of cognitive 
capacity may limit the capacity of people to have recourse to schemas (Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991). 
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Therefore it would appear that if jury members find their task cognitively 
demanding but manageable, they may not divert cognitive energy to active schemas. 
However, jury members like other legal decision-makers must sometimes process a 
complex body of ambiguous information (Hymes, Leinhart, Rowe, & Rogers, 1993) 
and come to a decision within a short period of time (Saks & Hastie, 1986). As noted 
earlier, it is under these circumstances of cognitive overload that people tend to use 
heuristics (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Wegner et al., 1993). 
From a theoretical perspective the heuristic that jurors are most likely to 
use when they are under cognitive pressure will be stereotypes because they are the 
most commonly used cognitive simplification methods (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; 
Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). The reason why stereotypes are most likely to be 
activated first, and very early, is because perceivers automatically classify people 
according to visually prominent physical features such as their age, gender and race 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and this leads to automatic associations with a stereotype 
(Fiske, 1998). There is also laboratory research with jury members that support the 
theory that jurors use stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1988). 
The problem with stereotypes is that despite being prevalent and usually 
effective in enhancing the cognitive functioning of people, they are inherently biasing 
(positive or negative) because their distinguishing feature is that they are over­
simplistic generalisations about typical characteristics of the members of a group 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1974). People of the relevant group are not recognised 
as distinct and unique individuals because a stereotype suggests that all members of 
the relevant construct share similar characteristics (Judd et al., 1991 ). 
This is particularly concerning because people firstly appear to classify 
people as members of an out-group (them) of one of their own in-group (us). 
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According to Fiske, (1998) this classification takes place in respect of any dimension 
on which the person differs from the perceiver, for example, race, gender, age, or 
physical capacity. Further, categorisation of the person takes place faster in respect of 
that specific personal dimension, rather than other dimensions. Out-group members 
are faster associated with stereotypic attributes than is the case with in-group 
members, and these stereotypic attributes prime other stereotypes for the relevant 
group. The effect of classifying a person as a member of an out-group and using the 
relevant stereotype in respect of the person has been demonstrated by researchers. For 
example, using priming methods, Fazio and Olson (2003) demonstrated that people 
identify positive attributes faster after subliminal exposure to the prompt us than to 
the prompt them. 
Collating the research evidence presented, and applying it to the jury 
situation, would appear to suggest that jurors would normally focus on the evidence 
offered in court, it does not overwhelm their cognitive capacity. However, if they are 
under cognitive pressure, their decision-making may be influenced by their 
stereotypes in respect of the victim and or the offender. Consequently features such 
as the person's race, gender or age may trigger stereotypical thinking on the part of 
the jurors. If this occurs it means that the relevant characteristic of the person has 
functioned as an extralegal variable. This would explain why the characteristics 
mentioned in the previous section such as age, appearance, gender, and race have 
been found in research to function as extralegal variables. 
However, unlike race, gender, and age, mental disorders are usually not 
visually discernable. Nevertheless, stereotypes can also be triggered by labels (Fiske, 
2004), and mental disordered is a label. It is therefore likely that people's stereotypes 
about individuals with mental disorders may function as an extralegal variable. In the 
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next section the literature on the nature of this stereotype in modem Western culture, 
and the impact that it has on perceivers when somebody is labelled as mentally 
disordered, will be examined. 
Mental Disorder Stereotype 
A cursory examination of the literature in the field reveals the discrimination that 
mentally disordered people have had to endure at social and legal levels during the 
centuries (see for example Allan, 2002). This suggests that Western people's 
stereotype of people with a mental disorder is negative and will have a negative 
impact on perceivers and lead to negative bias in the form of prejudice and 
discrimination. 
Much of the research regarding the prejudice and bias in respect of people 
with mental disorders was generated by proponents and critics of the sociological 
labelling theory of mental disorders as formulated by Scheff (1966; 1984). While not 
always directly relevant to this study, parts of this body of research literature will be 
examined because it provides the best source of information about the prevailing 
mental disorder stereotype in Western culture and its ef fect. Where appropriate 
psychological terminology will be used in this review instead of the original authors' 
sociological terminology. 
Labelling Theory of Mental Disorder 
Scheff (1966; 1984) ; first introduced the concept of labelling theory. Though 
it is unnecessary for the purpose of this study to fully examine Scheff' s theory, Scheff 
argued that people's stereotype of people with mental disorders are shaped by 
influences such as media reports, cartoons and jokes. He argued that the mental 
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disorder stereotype has two important components, namely that people with mental 
disorders are devalued and discriminated against. This stereotype is pivotal in how a 
person suffering a mental disorder is perceived by themselves and other people. As 
Link, Cullen, Frank, and Wozniak (1987), later proponents of labelling theory put it, 
the mentally disordered label serves as a "starting point that activates an array of 
beliefs about the designated person that may ultimately affect the level of acceptance 
or rejection such a person experiences" (p. 1474; and also see Reber, 1995). People 
are guided by this stereotype when they perceive and behave towards people with a 
mental disorder. Likewise, when people are given a mental disorder diagnosis (label) 
they expect to be devaluated and discriminated against. Consequently, Scheff argues, 
they behave in conformity with these stereotypical expectations. This stereotypical 
behaviour is reinforced by a system of rewards and punishment that confine the 
labelled person to the role of a mentally disordered person. If labelled people 
internalise this stereotypical role it becomes part of their central identity, and the end 
result is a chronic mental disorder. 
Some support for the labelling theory can be found in a classic study by 
Rosenhan (1973), however it should be taken into account that this study had several 
difficulties, including questionable ethics by today's standards, and the results should 
therefore be treated cautiously. Researchers in the Rosenhan study asked participants 
to complain of specific psychotic symptoms to psychiatrists at a psychiatric hospital. 
The participants were all admitted to the hospital. Upon admission to the psychiatric 
ward, all participants stopped complaining of the symptoms, and ceased any abnormal 
behaviour. When asked by staff how they were feeling, the pseudo-patients indicated 
that they felt fine. In spite of this, they were labelled as schizophrenics and spent 
considerable time in the hospital receiving treatment. Once discharged, they were 
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labelled as having schizophrenia in remission. Rosenhan concluded that once labelled, 
there was nothing the patient could do to overcome the tag and additionally the label 
influenced others' perceptions of the patient's behaviour. Furthermore, it was found 
that normal behaviour displayed by the participants were interpreted by the nursing 
staff as pathological, including such behaviours as diary writing. Rosenhan 
hypostudyed that the staff reasoned that given that the patient was hospitalised, the 
patient must be suffering from a psychological disturbance and since the patient was 
disturbed, the writing must be a behavioural manifestation of the disturbance. In 
short, the label did have a severe impact on how the pseudo-patients were viewed. 
The application of labels has lead to the creation of labelling theory, which is 
discussed below. 
Labelling theory has been heavily researched in recent decades (see for 
example Bottoms, Nysse-Carris, Harris, & Tyda, 2003; Link, Cullen, Frank, & 
Wozniak, 1 987; Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, Pescosolido, 1 999; Link, Struening, 
Cullen, & Shrout, 1 989; Martin, Pescosolido, & Tuch, 2000; Rosenfield, 1997; 
Walsh, 1990; Weinstein, 1983). However, the findings of these studies are not 
conclusive. 
That labelling stigmatises people suffering from a mental disorder (Link, 
1 982; Walsh, 1 990) and starts at a young age is well accepted. Wilson, Nairn, 
Coverdale and Panapa (2000), for example, demonstrated that labelling occurs as 
young children are being socialised into stigmatising concepts of mental illness when 
watching television. However, there has been criticism of the theory by, for example, 
Lehman, Ward, and Linn (1982) and Schwartz, Myers, and Astrachan (1974). The 
latter view mental disorders as a form of individual pathology in which the fate of 
people suffering from mental disorders depends on the severity of their symptoms and 
28 
the treatment they receive, not on factors such as labels. This led to the formulation 
of a so-called modified labelling theory (Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & 
Dohrenwend 1989). The modified theory does not postulate that the label directly 
causes mental illness, but emphasises that a label may have negative consequences for 
the patient in, for example, reducing self esteem and inducing fear of discrimination 
and prejudice. 
Consequences of Labelling People as Suffering a Mental disorder Disorder 
Irrespective of what the status of labelling theory and the modified theory 
may be currently, research arising from these theories has provided data that shed 
light on how pervasive the negative effect of the mental disorder stereotype can be. 
Personal implications to people suffering of a mental disorder. 
Both Link (1987) and Struening, Dohrenwend, Cullen, Shrout and Link (1989) 
found that people who are officially diagnosed as mentally disordered devalue 
themselves; fear that they may be rejected by others, and believe that they were 
discriminated against by others. Likewise Sirey, Bruce, Alexopoulos, Perlick, Raue, 
Friedman, and Meyers (2001) discovered that the majority of patients seeking 
treatment for depression in their study, believed they experienced prejudice. This was 
especially true for younger people. 
The issue of perceived prejudice is important as it often adversely affects well­
being and life satisfaction of the relevant individuals. A study illustrating this fact was 
conducted by Rosenfield (1997). The effects of received services and perceived 
stigma on life satisfaction were examined, and it was found that both stigma and 
services received were significantly correlated with quality of life, but in opposite 
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directions. The fact that the diagnosis allowed the individual to receive mental 
disorder services was positively linked with life satisfaction. The perceived stigma 
attached to the label, however, was negatively associated with life satisfaction. 
A number of other studies have found similar results, indicating a negative 
effect on wellbeing correlated with the implementation of a label. For example, Link, 
Struening, Rahav, Phelan and Nuttbrock (1997) found a strong and enduring negative 
effect of perceived prejudice on the wellbeing of participants when examining the 
experiences of individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness and substance abuse. 
Their results further suggested that the perceived prejudice continued to affect the 
lives of the participants even after they had successfully gone through treatment and 
symptoms were alleviated. 
Treatment implications. 
Sirey et al. (2001) found that while older patients reported lower levels of 
perceived prejudice than did younger patients, they were more likely to discontinue 
the treatment as a result of perceived prejudice. It should also be noted that research 
has found that social and cultural factors may lead some individual to express the 
psychological distress in somatic terms (headaches, limb and joint pains etc) in an 
effort to avoid being stigmatised (Raguram, Weiss, Channabasavanna, & Devins, 
1996). 
Social impact. 
Struening, Dohrenwend, Cullen, Shrout and Link (1989) found that both 
patients and community residents believe that most people will reject mental disorder 
consumers. An indication that this fear is probably well-founded is the study by 
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Martin, Pescosolido and Tuch (2000) in which they, amongst other things, measured 
the social distance participants indicated they would keep from psychiatric patients. 
The researchers showed that participants were unwilling to interact with people with 
a mental disorder label and kept a social distance from them. Martin and his 
colleagues concluded that this was a manifestation of discrimination because those 
participants who believed that mental illness was caused by bad character or 
upbringing, sought the greatest social distance. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that Link (1982) found that psychiatric 
labelling increases underemployment, and decreases income when compared to 
similarly impaired people, who are undiagnosed and unlabelled. 
Content of Stereotypes 
Initial studies did not examine what exactly it was about a mental disorder 
label that led to the prejudice and discrimination in the form of, for example, social 
distancing, that researchers observed. Consequently critics like Clausen (1981) 
suggested that perceivers may react to the inappropriate behaviour of people with a 
mental disorder, rather than the labels themselves. 
When Link et al. (1987) examined this suggestion they found that in ten of the 
twelve studies they reviewed, the effect for behaviour was significantly stronger than 
the influence of the mental disorder label. They hypostudyed that it was not the 
disorder as such, but a stereotype that associates dangerousness with mental disorders, 
that leads to prejudice and discrimination. This was confirmed when they found that 
it was only when perceived dangerousness was introduced together with a mental 
disorder label, that strong negative effects emerged in respect of the measure of social 
distance. 
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This is an important finding because a growing list of recent studies suggest 
that while the public's knowledge of mental illness is improving, this is not 
necessarily changing the cultural stereotype of a person with a mental illness. This 
cultural stereotypes seems to link a mental disorder with violent behaviour. Three 
studies that demonstrate this link between mental disorder violence, and shed some 
more information on the content of the mental disorder stereotype, will be briefly 
discussed next. 
Link et al. ( 1999) examined the public conception of mental disorders, 
conceptions related to recognition of mental disorders; perceived causes for mental 
disorder, perceived dangerousness of people with mental disorders and desired social 
distance. It was found that the majority of the respondents were able to identify 
disorders such as schizophrenia and depression and that they were able to give a 
multicausal explanation for the disorders, including stress, genetics, biological factors 
and drugs. However, the results further indicated that the symptoms of mental 
disorders remained strongly linked to perceptions of violence and it is hypothesised 
that the fear of violence in turn leads to a desire for social distance. 
Pescosolido, Monahan, Link, Stueve, and Kikuzawa (1999) analysed the data 
of the General Social Survey that has been conducted since 1972 by the National 
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. This is a national face-to-face 
survey designed to monitor the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour of American people 
on critical social issues. The authors found that participants differentiated between 
different forms of mental disorders, and were more sympathetic to people suffering 
from depression. However, the data did not reveal whether this was because they 
were more familiar with depression, or failed to recognize depression as a mental 
disorder problem. Another explanation may be that they found depression more 
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acceptable than other mental illnesses due to a perceived reduced level of violence. 
Nevertheless, Pescosolido and her colleagues found that the American public's 
negative attitude of people with mental disorders continues and that respondents 
perceived people labelled as mentally disordered as less competent and more likely to 
be violent. 
The third study is that by Phelan (2000) who examined American public 
conceptions of mental illness, specifically comparing the conceptions in 1950 and 
1996. Phelan found that the general public in 1996 were better informed and included 
a greater proportion of non-psychotic disorders under the mental disorder umbrella 
than they did in 1950. However, the research also confirmed the perception that 
individuals with mental disorders, particularly individuals with psychosis, are violent 
and frightening has increased since the 1950's. 
While these three studies are not Australian, they provide some indication of 
what the Australian jurors' stereotypes of people with a mental disorder may be. 
Some support for this suggestion was found in a depression awareness study 
conducted by the Mental disorder Institute of Victoria (2004). Results from a survey 
conducted in five different postcode specified regions in Victoria revealed poor levels 
of community literacy about major depression. Results indicated that depression often 
was not viewed as an illness, but as a personal weakness or inadequacy. The 
researchers also found a lack of understanding of the nature of the illness, with 
respondents confusing the illness with a more transient mood state (sadness). 
From the identified research it can be surmised that jurors may be 
sophisticated enough to distinguish between different forms of mental disorders such 
as schizophrenia and depression. However, it would appear likely that the stereotype 
of people with mental disorders may in general still be negative, especially if the 
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perceiver makes an association between mental disorder and the risk of violent 
behaviour (Pescosolido et al., 1999; Phelan et al., 2000). Other elements of the 
stereotype may be that people with a mental disorder are incompetent and even 
responsible for their condition. A study by Weiner, Perry, and Magnusson (1988) 
investigated attribution of responsibility and found that students, when asked to make 
judgements about people such as AIDS patients, the obese and war veterans suffering 
from mental disorders, viewed people with mental disorders as more responsible for 
their condition. The participants in that study were found to be just as likely to regard 
people suffering from a mental disorder with anger as with pity and the authors 
concluded that the participants viewed people with a mental disorder as choosing to 
behave the way they do. 
Deliberations as a Mediating Factor of Individual Prejudice 
It can be argued that the deliberation phase of a jury trial is not only a vital part of the 
justice process, but it is also particularly interesting in relation to extralegal biases, as 
it is a group process where the opinion of individuals may well be influenced by the 
opinions of others. The possibility of being influenced during the deliberation is of 
particular importance in relation to extralegal variables, as there exist a possibility that 
the individual prejudices brought to deliberation by jurors may be decreased (Kaplan 
& Miller, 1978) or increased (MacCoun, 1990) by the deliberation process, as the 
jurors influence each other. Juror influence is illustrated by a study conducted by 
Foley and Pigott ( 1997) who found that all members of the jury wielded influence, but 
that the foreperson in particular influenced the other jurors significantly more than 
other members of the jury. That study concluded that this was because the foreperson 
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is chosen due to his or her willingness to be an opinion leader, not because of any 
specific knowledge or leadership qualitites. 
Also pertinent for this research is the observation that, (as was discussed 
earlier) there are situations where jurors are likely to be more vigilant and it would 
appear that deliberation may be such a situation. For example, during deliberation, 
jurors must express opinions in front of other people whose biases they do not know, 
or may suspect will be unbiased (see Janis & Mann, 1977). They may also want to 
appear to be good decision-makers (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988). Given that they are gathered to make a decision they 
are also likely to be in a purposeful decision making frame of mind (see Gollwitzer & 
Kinney, (1989). Finally, they will realise that their decision is important for the 
litigants and will have been warned to set aside their biases and focus on the evidence 
(see Fiske, 2004). 
It is therefore not surprising that there has been a considerable amount of 
research into jury decision making and judgements (see for example Devine et al., 
2001; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999; Otto, Penrod, & Dexter, 1994). Research has 
shown that the deliberation process may act as a mediating variable (Izzett & 
Leginski, 1974) in relation to prejudices and stereotypes of jurors, however, there are 
some contradictory results (Kramer, Kerr & Carroll, 1990). The literature on 
deliberation will now therefore be further examined. 
In looking at the deliberation process, it has been found that jurors often form 
their opinions regarding the defendant's guilt early on in the trial and transfer these to 
the jury room (Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Tanford and Penrod (1986) studied several 
aspects of the jury decision making process, including individual voting behaviour, 
group verdicts, the content of deliberations and jurors' cognitive processes after 
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deliberation. Their results indicated that the initial vote distribution was a good 
indicator of the final verdict, and the participants subscribing to an opinion held by 
the majority of the jury tended to win. Furthermore, the findings of the study 
suggested that the first vote was the result of the content of the deliberation, (e.g. the 
facts of the case and the juror's preference for guilty/not guilty), and vote distribution, 
whereas the following votes were based on normative pressures. Tanford and 
Penrod's (1986) results supports the findings of Dillehay and Nietzel (1980). Both of 
the mentioned studies did not show any change in vote distribution after deliberation 
and it was initial preconceptions of jurors that determined their individual judgements, 
both before and after jury room discussion. 
However, other research has found deliberation processes do notably effect 
individual judgements. A study by McGuire and Bermant (1977) on individual and 
group decisions in a mock trial indicated that before the deliberation there was no 
difference in distributions of the individual juror's verdicts in relation to the sex of the 
attorney and race of the offender. Post-deliberation however, jurors who had viewed a 
video depicting a male defence attorney were more likely to vote for acquittal than 
were the jurors who had viewed a video depicting a female defence attorney. In an 
unrelated study about inadmissible evidence and the effect jury deliberations have on 
jurors' propensity to comply with instructions to dismiss the evidence, London and 
Nunez (2000) discovered that although the inadmissible evidence did influence the 
jurors pre-deliberation, this effect had been eliminated post-deliberation. Their finding 
supported that of Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) who found that juries that participated in 
deliberation were more likely to follow judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible 
evidence than jurors who did not deliberate. This appears to confirm the social 
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cognitive research that people who are in decision making mode and know that they 
will be judged can set aside their stereotypes (Fiske, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
A high number of studies have investigated leniency effects ( e.g. the tendency 
to be more understanding and/or assigning lesser guilt) as a result of deliberation 
processes. Leniency effects as a result of deliberation can be seen as an increase in 
bias, whereby the leniency towards one trial participant ( defendant or victim) will 
positively affect that individual in an unfair way, and at the same time, another trial 
participant ( defendant or victim) will be disadvantaged due to the leniency provided 
to the other party. 
Although a few studies suggest that deliberation does not change attitudes of 
the jurors (Dillehay & Nietzel, 1980; Tanford & Penrod, 1986; Weiten & Diamond, 
1979), this is inconsistent with a large body of research which suggests that 
deliberation often leads to leniency effects as an outcome (MacCoun, 1 990; Izzett & 
Leginski, 1 974; Stewart, 1985). The leniency effect is illustrated by a study conducted 
by Izzett and Leginski in 1974. The researchers asked participants to decide on a 
sentence for a defendant. Results indicated that prior to group deliberation, an 
unattractive defendant received a significantly longer sentence than an attractive 
defendant by the individual jurors. After the deliberation, there was a shift towards 
leniency. The unattractive defendant now received a significantly lower sentence than 
before the deliberation. There was no difference for the attractive defendant. The 
authors suggest that jurors might abandon the most extreme positions when part of a 
group. However, reversed findings were found in a study by MacCoun (1990). Here 
results indicated that the physical attractiveness of the defendant influenced the jury 
members during deliberation. When the defendant was attractive, there was a shift 
towards leniency, but no such shift was found when the defendant was unattractive. 
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Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) have also found deliberation processes might reduce 
prejudicial effects. However, this study did not establish whether this is the typical 
pattern of deliberation effect. 
It could be argued that research findings supporting the leniency effect 
effectively support the suggestion that the deliberation process has a mediating effect 
on pre-deliberation biases (biases held by the individual jurors before the 
deliberation). It therefore seems that deliberation may be vital in the effort to 
minimise extralegal variables and thereby increase the fairness of the trial for all 
participants involved. 
Deliberation has also been shown to have a positive impact on reducing 
biases. In a classic study by Kaplan and Miller (1978) investigating variables that 
could reduce the effect of juror bias, it was found the effects of trait biases (e.g. 
leniency or harshness) were significantly reduced when conditions that increased the 
credibility, reliability and trustworthiness of the trial evidence were introduced. 
Situational biases (transient mood states, e.g. bad mood) were introduced in another 
experiment and these were ameliorated by a period of deliberation. Kaplan and Miller 
interpreted the findings to mean that the bias reducing procedures introduced into the 
situation increased the salience of the information taken into account in judgement 
formation. In another study investigating jury decision making, it was shown that 
deliberation also impacts favourably on jurors' compliance with judicial instructions 
to ignore inadmissible evidence, something that would decrease bias of the jury and 
the outcome of the trial (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). 
Another phenomenon that has emerged in research on deliberation effects is 
polarisation. MacCoun and Kerr (1988) have shown that individual verdict decisions 
at pre-deliberation become stronger and often more polarised during the deliberation .. 
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Brauer, Judd and Gliner (1995) built on the existing knowledge on attitude 
polarisation in deliberation by focusing on the effects of repeated expressions ( e.g. 
opinions expressed more than once) during the discussions. It was found that repeated 
expression did produce a reliable shift in extremity, in that other jurors changed their 
opinions after having listened to repeated expression. This effect was even stronger in 
groups where the jurors repeated the others' statements and used them in their own 
line of reasoning. The authorsconsidered thatpolarisation is at least partly accounted 
for by repeated expressions and that social interaction also plays a part. This 
phenomenon is important to take into consideration when investigating group 
influences during deliberation, as it may aid in explaining the behaviour of the jurors. 
A final aspect of jury deliberation that should be noted is that a large portion 
of the research on deliberation previously cited in this study, does not analyse the 
group processes within juries during the deliberation. Instead, the research appear to 
largely examine individual juror answers before and after the deliberation, without 
analysing the potential influence of a group discussion on these. Typically individual 
juror answers are analysed as a unit (all answers and scores put together and the 
average is used) but with little or no group deliberation analysis conducted (see for 
example Izzett & Leginski, 1974; McCoy, Nunez, & Dammeyer, 1999; London & 
Nunez, 2000, none of which analysed deliberation contents). 
Gender as a Factor in Jury Research Where the Offence is of a Sexual Nature 
It appears that one aspect of deliberation that has not been much researched to 
date is gender differences in juries and how these may influence the outcome of 
deliberation. While group processes within the deliberation period have attracted 
some attention, gender issues have rarely been investigated. One notable exception is 
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research into decision making when the case involves sexual assault. Here, research 
relating to judgements about sex crimes suggest that gender is indeed related to the 
perception of rape and sexual assault (Cowan, 2000) and research on attitudes about 
sexual offences has further indicated that men in general are more accepting of rape 
myths than are women (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). 
A wealth of research confirm that gender difference relating to beliefs about 
sexual assaults transfer into the courtroom and influence jurors attitudes and 
reasoning about sexual assault crimes (Kanekar & Nazareth, 1988; Cowan, 2000; 
Guy & Edens, 2003). Gender differences are illustrated in a study by Kanekar and 
Nazareth (1988) in which jurors were asked to recommend the sentence for a 
defendant, after having read a case in which the victim's attractiveness, degree of 
physical harm and emotional disturbance was varied. The results showed that females 
recommended longer sentences than did males in all conditions. Males also assigned 
greater fault to the victim than the female jurors did, though they were somewhat 
more lenient towards the emotionally disturbed victim. The results from the Kanekar 
and Nazareth study mirror the findings in a similar study by Fischer (1991), 
investigating cognitive predictors of not-guilty verdicts in mock rape trials. In that 
study, the results indicated that jurors who were male or who tended to blame the 
victim, were more likely to render a not-guilty verdict than female participants, or 
participants who did not blame the victim. 
However, although female jurors appear to be consistently more punitive 
toward the defendant in sexual assault cases, some research also suggests that females 
tend to blame the victim more, especially when they perceive the behaviour of the 
victim to be inappropriate (Langley, Yost, Taylor, Frankel, & Craig, 1991). 
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While it is established that gender is related to differing perceptions of the 
victim, defendant and the crime in sexual assault cases, it can not safely be said that 
these findings can be generalised to other types of crimes, as little research has been 
conducted in other areas, at least until recently. In a study by Bull Kovera, McAuliff, 
and Hebert (1999) into the reasoning about scientific evidence in a hostile work 
environment case, it was found that male jurors who heard expert testimony were 
more likely to consider the plaintiffs workplace hostile, than male jurors who did not 
hear expert testimony. Expert testimony did, however, not influence the female jurors 
liability judgments. In another study, by ForsterLee et al. (1999) gender differences 
were found when examining community members' perceptions of evidence. The 
participants were asked to act as jurors in a recovered memory civil trial. Results 
indicated that female jurors were more likely to find the defendant liable when the 
plaintiff was female than when the plaintiff was male. The reverse was true for the 
male jurors. 
When examining gender as an extralegal variable, it becomes clear that 
research often fails to consider potential gender differences. While studies depicting 
sex crimes have found gender differences in the assignment of punishment and 
responsibility (Cowan, 2000; Fischer, 1991; Langley et al., 1991), similar studies of 
juror decision making and gender differences in crimes other than sexual assaults, 
have been far and few between. Even in studies depicting sex crimes, the contrast in 
perceptions between the genders are rarely reported. 
Methodological Issues in Jury Research 
Uncertainty about exactly how jury deliberations and extralegal variables 
influence the decision making processes of jurors is exacerbated by several 
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methodological concerns regarding jury research. Consequently a review of the 
literature on pertinent methodological issues in jury research was undertaken and the 
findings are now reported. 
Real Versus Juries 
In their review of jury decision making, Devine et al. (2001) found that four 
different methodologies primarily were used in this type of research. These included 
jury experiments, post-deliberation interviews with ex-jurors, analyses of jury verdicts 
from archival sources and experiments with real juries. Devine et al. (2001) concluded 
that while the juror paradigm had been used most frequently, all of the different 
methods have advantages and disadvantages. Though traditionally, jury research has 
relied on juries, a this may impact on the generalisability of the studies. It is however 
hard to avoid simulated settings for juror research for several reasons. Firstly, in many 
countries, there are restrictions on access to actual jury deliberation. In Australia it is 
difficult to obtain permission to use actual juries for research and few studies have 
therefore been conducted analysing deliberation data from actual juries. Secondly, due 
to the nature of jury research, the experimental design often does not allow for the use 
of real juries. For example, to find twelve similar rape cases, where the victim 
suffered from specific mental disorders, and compare them to each other, would not 
be a feasible proposition and there would be inherent problems with confounding 
variables, as the victims would be different, as well as the details of the case. 
Therefore, a jury is often the better option. However, when constructing a mock jury, 
there are some aspects that need to be considered, in order to obtain a jury as similar 
to an actual jury as possible. These include issues such as the size of the jury and 
choice of participants, which now be considered. 
42 
Size of Juries 
Though the research available is somewhat inconsistent, it appears that fewer 
than twelve jurors in a jury does not necessarily affect the process of decision making. 
This is illustrated by a study by Kerr and MacCoun (1985) who investigated jury size. 
It was found that no process differences emerged when the number of members of a 
jury were between six to twelve people. However, when juries were limited to three 
people or less, process differences began to appear when compared to the larger 
groups. A more recent study by Saks and W eighner Marti ( 1997) also indicated 
various advantages with larger juries, namely that larger groups are more likely to 
contain members of minority groups, and that they tend to deliberate for a longer time 
period. However, this study also found that larger juries also hang more often than 
smaller ones. Horowitz and Bordens (2002) investigated jury size, evidence 
complexity and note taking in civil trials and found that twelve person juries 
deliberated longer, recalled more probative information and relied less on evaluative 
statements than did six-person juries. As no process differences seem to appear in 
juries with as few members as six (Kerr & MacCoun, 1985), a jury of this number 
appears to be a viable option. 
From the mentioned jury research it appears that small juries may not be as 
advantageous as larger juries in that they may not deliberate in as much depth and 
may not contain members from minority groups. However, it should also be noted 
that research has shown that even when jury members are of the same minority as the 
victim, this may not work in the victim's favour. The minority juror may well be more 
critical of the victim's conduct than other jurors would be (Kerr et al., 1995) thus 
raising the question as to the utility of including minority members in the jury. 
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Participants 
It is commonly accepted that when recruiting participants for jury research, 
one should strive to use a sample that is not only randomly selected but which is also 
representative of the people who could be expected to be in a jury, that is, the 
population at large (Allan, personal communication, 30/06/04). 
Previous research on jury simulations has shown an overreliance on University 
students forming these juries (Cvetkovich & Baumgardner, 1973). The limitation is 
that while students are community members and therefore potential jurors, they 
represent a select group rather than being representative of the general population for 
jury duty. Dillehay and Nietzel (1980) suggest students are, for example, less likely to 
convict defendants. Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) argue that students are more likely than 
non-students to pay attention to details in the case, in addition to understanding jury 
instructions better than non-students. These studies indicate that students may be less 
prejudicial than the general population, and due to their studies, more cognitively 
astute. In terms of the extralegal variables it could be speculated that they may be 
better informed about issues such as race or mental illness and may therefore give 
more socially acceptable answers. This would lead to skewed results and therefore, 
while it is often easy to obtain large student samples, it is not advisable to use students 
for these reasons. 
Material Used to Present Simulated Court Proceedings 
When conducting jury research, the generally accepted methodology for jury 
experiments consist of either a script, audio recording or a video depicting a trial 
(Devine et al., 2001). While all these methods carry with them the disadvantage of 
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being a condensed version of a case and thus not as authentic as a real trial, they also 
allow for keeping all variables constant, thus eliminating many potentially 
confounding variables, such as different settings, victims, defendants. Observations 
have been made about the requirements for the simulation of court proceedings. For 
example, a study by Bray and Kerr (1979) critisised written case material and stated 
that it was often too brief and overly simplistic, thus taking away from the 
authenticity of the situation. Furthermore, they considered that audio recordings 
commonly between 30-90 minutes long, were too short, again detracting from the 
authenticity of the process. 
However, though jury simulations have been critisised, they are generally 
accepted given the impracticality of research on real juries and cases. The use of a 
videotaped trial appears to be used more than scripts or audio recordings (Devine et 
al., 2001) and offers several advantages. Video recordings are richer in context in that 
jurors will see what is taking place, whereas in a script, this is not possible. 
Furthermore, it is closer to what a real trial is like, therefore making generalisation to 
a larger population easier. However, a potential disadvantage of video recording is 
that jurors will also have a greater opportunity to incorporate their own personal 
interpretations of trial participant behaviour and the reasons for this, and while this 
would inevitably occur in a real trial, it may not be desirable in an experimental 
setting. 
Instructions 
One of the causes for concern with the research previously conducted on jury 
deliberations, is the lack of jury instructions. It appears that many studies have not 
included jury instructions before letting the participants commence the deliberation 
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(Foley, & Piggott, 1997; Kameda, 1991; McCoy, Nunez, & Dammeyer, 1999). This is 
problematic as it not only takes away from the authenticity of the experiment, but also 
because studies have shown that jury instructions are very important. For example a 
study by Ellsworth and Reifman (2000) on juror comprehension and public policy (in 
response to a claim that jurors are not competent to make fair decisions, but that 
professional juries may be a better option). Results indicated that the problems with 
juries may not be due to bad jurors but due to procedural obstacles, such as 
incomprehensible instructions, to decision making. Finkel (2000) reached a similar 
conclusion when investigating. He reported that jury nullification ( explained as 
occurring when a jury does not apply the law, or rejects evidence in a case, because 
the result dictated by the law is contrary to the jury's sense of justice) was more likely 
due to a failure of the jury instructions, rather than the inability of the jurors. When 
clear jury instructions are provided the jurors have a guide as how to come to their 
decision and will know that they should focus on the facts rather than their schema. 
This in turn may aid in eliminating the use of extralegal variables, as was discussed 
earlier. Therefore, in this study it was considered essential to include jury instructions. 
Ambiguous facts 
Another issue to consider when designing a study on juries, is ambiguous facts 
in trials. Some research indicates that deliberations and juror decision making are 
influenced if the facts of the case are ambiguous, for example presentation of weak 
evidence or inconsistent testimony. This is illustrated in a study by Hendry, Shaffer 
and Peacock (1989) who focused on the interaction between evidential strength 
(strong, balanced or weak) and defendant's demeanour (control or deceptive). This 
study found that the demeanour effects were strongest when the evidence was weak 
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and it was concluded that a defendant can undermine the chances of acquittal by poor 
self-representation. 
Another study exemplifying the influence ambiguous factors can have in a 
trial was that of Berman and Cutler (1996). This study found that any type of 
inconsistent testimony had a clear negative impact on conviction rates. Jurors who 
were exposed to inconsistent testimony not only picked up on it, but were also 
significantly less likely to convict the defendant. The jurors further found the 
defendant less culpable of the crime and the eyewitness was perceived as less 
effective. 
However, ambiguous facts may be deliberately brought into a study, when the 
purpose is to observe the deliberation process and the influence jury members have on 
each other. With weak evidence comes uncertainty, something that is likely to 
increase the deliberation time and may also cause the jurors to use their schemas and 
therefore bring their own biases into the discussion. For this reason, in this study the 
decision was made to deliberately have ambiguous facts. 
Conclusion to Literature Review 
This literature review demonstrates that various extralegal variables in the 
criminal justice system have been identified and that stereotypes about personal 
characteristics such as race and attractiveness can function as extralegal factors that 
influence the outcome of jury decision making. Factors that may however influence 
the effect of stereotypes are jury deliberation and, especially in the case of sexual 
offences, gender of jury members. Despite evidence that people in the Western world 
have negative stereotypes about people suffering from mental disorders, the 
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possibility that mental disorder of a person may function as an extralegal variable has 
not been examined to date. 
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Method 
Design and Analysis 
This study aimed to investigate whether jurors' perceptions of victims, the 
crime and the defendant would be different if the victims were labelled as mentally 
disordered. The mental disorder labels of the victims (schizophrenia, depression, 
intellectual disability) and the control group (no label) were manipulated in the design 
of the experiment. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions. Random assignment was conducted in order to establish 
equivalent groups for each research condition by balancing individual differences. 
Another aim of the study was to determine whether jurors' perceptions of 
victims, the crime and the defendant would be different for male and female jurors 
and whether deliberation would change these perceptions of the individual jurors. 
This study therefore aimed to investigate the simultaneous effect of three independent 
variables. A mixed factorial design was employed with mental disorder of the victim 
and the gender of the jurors as between subject factors, and deliberation the within 
subject factor. 
The following dependent variables were investigated. Variables concerned 
with perceptions of and emotions related to the victim included: likeableness, 
reliability, honesty, sympathy felt for the victim, and value to the community. 
Variables related to perceptions of the crime included seriousness of the crime, impact 
of and responsibility for the crime. Variables regarding perceptions and decisions 
related to the defendant included: defendant guilt and recommended sentence. The 
length of sentence could range from one to ten years, and all the other dependent 
variables were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. 
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As the object of the study was to investigate the interactions between two 
between subject variables (mental disorder label and gender) and one within subject 
variable ( deliberation) a mixed design analysis of variance (ANOV A) technique was 
utilised to analyse the data. A series of 4x2x2 ANOV As (mental disorder x gender x 
deliberation) were employed across ten affective (victim) and cognitive (crime, guilt) 
dependent variables. The effect size was investigated by means of eta squared and 
interpreted based on Cohen's (1988) guidelines. Single factor ANOVAs and Tukey's 
Honestly Significant Differences (HSD) tests were employed for post hoc analyses of 
significant interaction effects, and significant main effects where indicated. An alpha 
level of .05 was used in the study, as it is a significance level commonly used and 
accepted in behavioural research (Whitley, 1996). 
In addition, qualitative analysis was used for the deliberation phase and 
matched with the ANOVA results, to assist in clarifying the results and adding 
richness to the interpretation. Ellsworth (1989), found that the content of jury 
deliberation included a discussion of the evidence, the defendants' and witnesses' 
testimony, the law, call for a vote, and the judge's instructions. Based on Ellsworth's 
research, a list of categories that defined particular topics of conversation was 
developed by an independent psychologist in collaboration with the researcher. The 
categories (defendant, victim, witnesses, defendant's guilt, evidence, crime, jury 
instructions, miscellaneous) were based upon the most frequently discussed themes in 
these juries and information from previous research. To triangulate the chosen 
categories, two postgraduate psychology students viewed the taped deliberations 
without having any prior knowledge of the study. They were asked to first view the 
tapes looking for emerging themes. The postgraduate students (assessors) agreed with 
the researcher's developed themes, thus the eight original themes were used. Once the 
50 
themes had been decided, the assessors began to analyse the individual comments 
made by the jurors with a view of placing them in one of the categories (themes). 
Each comment assigned to a category had to be agreed upon as belonging to that 
particular theme by both assessors before it could be assigned to the category. 
Comments that did not fit into any one category and comments that the assessors 
failed to agree upon, were put the miscellaneous category. The content of the eight 
categories is: 
• Defendant: All discussion related to the defendant, including testimony, 
appearance, behaviour at trial, overall believability and motive; 
• Victim: All discussion related to the victim, including testimony, appearance, 
behaviour at trial and on the night of the crime, and overall believability; 
• Witnesses: Discussion related to all witnesses including their testimony, conduct 
in court, overall believability and appearance; 
• Defendant's Guilt: Discussion related to the guilt of the defendant including 
arguments as to the guilt of the defendant, and polling methods used by jurors; 
• Evidence: Discussion related to the evidence presented during the trial, including 
the missing watch, the jacket etc., as well as all testimony of the witnesses related 
to the evidence; 
• Crime: Discussion related to the crime, or that of attempted rape in general, 
including severity and differentiation between different sex crimes; 
• Jury Instructions: Discussion related to the jury instructions including queries as 
to what they mean, and how to interpret them; 
• Miscellaneous: All discussion that did not fit into any previous category, including 
discussion about other crimes, prior jury situations experienced by the jurors, such 
as crime TV shows. 
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The assessors used stopwatches to measure the length of time the juries spent 
discussing each of the different categories. The researcher then reviewed the 
comments assigned to each category, to ensure that all comments had indeed been 
classified. Finally the researcher calculated the mean of the two assessors timed 
categories, to reach the final time spent per category. The results were inserted in 
Table 4. 
Participants 
Ninety three participants were recruited via a series of advertisements in community 
newspapers and community centres in Perth, Western Australia. All participants were 
required to be over the age of 18, citizens of Australia and were on the electoral roll, 
thus making them eligible for jury duty. In accordance with the Jury Act (1957) 
people who are or have been judges, masters/registrars of a court, legal practitioners, 
members/officers of the legislative assembly or council, sheriffs of Western Australia, 
bailiffs or assistant bailiffs, police officers, special constables or Aboriginal Aides 
were excluded from participating in the study. When recruited, the participants were 
not asked whether they had any experience of jury duty, but during deliberations it 
became clear that three participants out of 93 had indeed had prior experience. 
Table 1 
Gender Representation in the Different Mental Disorder Conditions 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Control 
7 
1 6  
23 
Schizophrenia 
1 2  
1 1  
23 
Depression 
9 
14 
23 
Intellectual Disability 
14  
IO 
24 
Total 
32 
5 1  
93 
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For the reasons identified in the literature review, it was decided to proceed 
with the experiment though some participants did not attend the session allocated to 
them, provided that there were no less than six participants per jury. This resulted in 
twelve juries being involved in the study. The gender representation in the different 
conditions can be viewed in Table 1 above. In all conditions, there were more female 
jurors than male jurors, however the proportions remained relatively consistent across 
the conditions. 
Volunteers did not receive any form of remuneration for their participation, 
apart from some light refreshments. 
Material 
A video depicting a mock trial was used. The master video was filmed in a 
neutral court-like setting, namely the Francis Burt Law Museum. The roles of the trial 
participants, as well as the filming and editing were performed by Edith Cowan 
University students and faculty. 
Nine actors played the role of judge, defence lawyer, prosecutor, the 
accused, an eyewitness, a flatmate of the accused, a clerk, a policeman and the victim 
respectively. 
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This master video was used for all three conditions and the control group 
(no label). However, in order to distinguish between the information provided to the 
participants, an introduction was added to the master video that differed for the 
different conditions. In the schizophrenia, depression and intellectual disability 
conditions, the complainant was clearly identified as someone suffering from 
schizophrenia, depression or an intellectual disability respectively. This comment was 
not included in the introduction to the control group condition. The participants in 
each condition therefore viewed the same master video with the exception of the 
small difference in the introduction. 
The scenario was as follows: The defendant is accused of attempted rape. 
The alleged crime took place one evening when the female victim was driving home 
from work. The car broke down and the victim was forced to leave the car in order to 
get to a phone box. The victim was then pulled into an alley by the male defendant. 
The victim claims that the defendant began ripping her clothes off and attacking her. 
The victim did not scream, as she was frightened that he would kill her. A male 
bystander witnessed the incident and came to assist the victim. The defendant rushed 
off. The bystander recommended to the victim that she should report the attempted 
rape, but the victim was too frightened and declined. However, three days later, the 
victim changed her mind and did report the incident to the police. At this time she had 
burned her clothes and thoroughly washed several times. At investigation, no 
evidence was found. At a line-up, the victim was able to describe the appearance of 
the attacker and in addition was able to identify the defendant. The defence is now 
claiming mistaken identity. The bystander is called as a witness and identifies the 
defendant as the attacker. A second witness, a forensic scientist, is called but can only 
testify that the evidence from the crime scene is inconclusive. The policeman 
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handling the case is also called on to give his opinion on the credibility of the victim. 
All three witnesses, the defendant, and victim were subjected to direct and cross­
examination. For the transcript of the vignette, refer to Appendix B. The trial evidence 
was carefully designed to be ambiguous (in consultation with experienced lawyers), 
favouring neither the defendant nor the victim to encourage jurors to rely on external 
information, such as the characteristics of the defendant/victim (Hymes et al., 1993). 
A juror decision making questionnaire was developed from Greene, Koehring, 
and Quiat (1998) for pre and post testing. Nine statements about the victim 
(likeableness, reliability, honesty, sympathy, value to community), crime (seriousness, 
impact, victim's responsibility); and defendant (guilt) were provided in randomised 
order with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
For example, "The victim is a valuable member of the community". A further 
statement relating to defendant sentencing differed from the others, in that it ranged 
from a sentence of one year to ten years. Questionnaire A was completed pre­
deliberation by the individual jurors (See Appendix A, Questionnaire A). 
Questionnaire B was completed post-deliberation (See Appendix A, 
Questionnaire B). Questionnaire B contained the same questions as questionnaire A, 
however the items were in randomised order, in an attempt to ensure that the 
participants would find it more difficult to recall their previous answers and simply 
copy them. 
The third questionnaire (See Appendix A, questionnaire C) contained two 
open response questions, which attempted to directly assess the impact of mental 
disorders of victims on the participants' responses to the previous items on both 
Questionnaires A and B. This questionnaire was required to be completed after 
questionnaire B, that is, post- deliberation. Like the previous questionnaires, this 
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questionnaire was anchored by a seven- point Likert scale, but also contained a free 
response section. This was provided to allow the participants to name the reasons for 
the selected option on the scale. The questionnaires were placed in a sealed envelope 
after being answered. The questionnaires also contained an 'administration' section to 
remind participants of the victim details as well as providing the researcher with 
information of participant gender. No identifying information was required in the 
questionnaires, but each one was coded to allow the researchers to compare each 
participant's pre- and post-deliberation perceptions. 
The experiments were held at different Edith Cowan University Campuses 
(Joondalup, Churchlands and Mount Lawley, all in the Perth Metropolitan area), to 
make it easier for a range of participants to take part. The setting was kept as simple 
as possible, to ensure that confounding variables were kept to a minimum. The 
materials used included a large room equipped with chairs, a television, and a 
videocassette recorder. Pens were also provided. A video camera (put unobtrusively 
in a comer) was used for the taping of the deliberation and a box was provided for the 
questionnaires. Apart from this, the rooms used for the experiments were empty. 
Other resources used included the aid and expertise of an experienced lawyer, 
who assisted in reading the manuscript of the trial and made suggestions for 
improvements; an independent psychologist who assisted in developing the categories 
used for the analysis of the deliberation phase, and; two post-graduate psychology 
students who acted as assessors and went through the videotaped deliberations. These 
individuals were all employed or studying at Edith Cowan University at the time this 
study was conducted. 
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Procedure 
After reading an information sheet (which also included the mental 
disorder labels when describing the victim) and signing a consent form, the 
participants were seated and asked to watch the vignette. There were three versions of 
the vignette (Appendix B) and one control condition (no label), each introducing 
different victim characteristics (schizophrenia, depression, and intellectual disorder). 
After watching the vignette, the participants were asked to complete the pre­
deliberation questionnaire about the trial individually (Appendix A, Questionnaire A). 
Upon completion, this questionnaire was placed in a locked box and the participants 
were served some refreshments after which they proceeded to a group deliberation. 
The participants were asked not to discuss the case before commencement of the 
deliberation phase. The deliberation began with the researcher reading off a set of 
standard jury instructions, which were to guide their deliberation. Each group was 
allowed to deliberate for up to an hour, and were informed that they must reach a 
verdict within the time limit. During the deliberation, the participants were videotaped 
to allow for subsequent observation of their discussion and how they addressed 
mental illness and the other areas being researched. Where necessary, the participants 
were informed when they had five minutes left of deliberation time, after which they 
were asked to render a verdict. Three juries out of twelve needed this prompt. After 
finishing the deliberation, participants were asked to complete the post-deliberation 
questionnaires (refer to Appendix A, Questionnaire B and Questionnaire C). Finally 
they were fully debriefed about the study, and their questions were answered. 
The jury instructions were obtained from a study by MacCoun et al. (1988), 
and modified to suit the present study. They were read out to the participants verbatim 
according to the format below: 
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Before you can find a man guilty of a crime, the prosecution must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the crime. That is, it is 
up to the prosecution to prove there is more evidence of the defendant's guilt than of 
his innocence. If the weight of the evidence for the defendant's guilt is greater than 
the weight of evidence for his innocence, then the prosecution has met its burden and 
you must find the defendant guilty as charged. If, on the other hand, you feel that the 
evidence for the defendant's innocence has greater weight than the evidence for his 
guilt, then you must find him not guilty. If the evidence suggests to you that it is more 
likely that the defendant committed the crime, than not, the law requires you to find 
him guilty as charged; but if you feel that it is more likely that he is innocent than 
guilty, the law requires you to find him not guilty. In summary, your verdict must 
favour the side that has presented the stronger evidence. 
Results 
Quantitative 
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Preliminary oneway analyses showed no significant differences within each 
set of juries dedicated to any victim's label. Data for the different juries for each 
mental disorder label were thus combined for the series of three-way ANOV As. Cell 
means and standard deviations for the critical comparison variable labelling of mental 
disorder, as well as for gender and deliberation are reported in Table 2 below 
alongside significant effects. The detailed ANOVA results are presented in Table 3. 
The requirements of ANOVA are that the data meet two assumptions, namely 
normality and homogeneity of variance. 
Most of the items approached a normal distribution, but some skewness and 
non- normal kurtosis were identified for four of the items. For seriousness of the 
crime the distribution of both pre and post scores showed some positive kurtosis and 
negative skewness, indicating that the majority of the participants regarded the crime 
as very serious. For sympathy towards the victim the distribution of pre-deliberation 
scores were negatively skewed, indicating that the majority of the participants were 
very sympathetic towards the victim. In contrast, the distributions were positively 
skewed both pre and post-deliberation for responsibility for the crime and post­
deliberation for length of sentence assigned to the defendant. This indicates that the 
majority of the participants rated the victim's responsibility for the crime as low, and 
assigned a relatively short sentence to the defendant. Skewness in favour of the 
victim is not surprising, given the nature of the crime, but the relatively short sentence 
is. However, the indecision in relation to the guilt of the defendant, is probably the 
reason for the short sentence. 
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The deviations from normality are not of much concern. The skewness and kurtosis 
were not great and the values tended to be the same across all disorders and for both 
males and females. According to Keppel and Wickens (2004) "computer packages 
can pick up deviations from normality that have no impact on the test of means" 
(p. 144). When groups of about twelve or more are compared, they suggest that 
researchers need not be concerned about the assumption of normality. Keppel and 
Wickens warn that skewness can be a problem when sample sizes are unequal, as is 
the case for males and females in this study. However, this is not a concern as the 
SPSS regression approach was used which give equal weight to all means regardless 
of the sample size. As the comparison groups were sometimes less than 12 for 
gender, caution was necessary in the interpretation of the results for gender, especially 
in respect of the control group which included only 7 male participants (see Table 1). 
Tests of homogeneity showed some non-homogeneity of variance and 
covariance matrices for sympathy towards the victim, responsibility for the crime, and 
the sentence assigned to the defendant. For these variables, both the assumptions of 
normality and homogeneous variances are thus violated. In these cases there is a 
possibility of Type 1 error (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). The simplest response to 
heterogeneity is to use a more stringent significance level. The authors suggest that 
the Type 1 error will be kept below the 5 percent level if the alpha level is set at .025. 
For the variables of sympathy towards the victim, responsibility for the crime and 
sentence assigned to the defendant, the effect of a more stringent significance level 
will be considered. 
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Victim 
There were no significant ef fects on the sympathy felt for the victim or the 
value of the victim to society in the analyses. 
There was however a significant main effect for likeableness of the victim 
depending on disorder label (,/ = .078). The intellectual qisability (M = 5.24) and 
schizophrenia victims (M = 4.87) were perceived as the most likeable, followed by the 
depression (M = 4.46) and no label victim (M = 4.34). Post hoc HSD tests showed that 
the intellectual disability victim was significantly more likeable than the depression 
victim ( p < .05) and the victim without label (p < .05). 
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between disorder, deliberation 
and gender in respect of the perceived reliability of the victim (,/ = .032). The 
interaction is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 (on pages 64 and 65). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Judgements of Victim, Crime and Defendant as a Function of Victim Disorder, Jury Member Gender and Deliberation 
Mental Disorder Label Gender 
Control Schizophrenia Depression Intellectual Disability Male Female Total 
Item M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD Significant Effects 
Victim 
Likeable 
Pre 4.36 0.73 4.91 1 .08 4.48 0.90 5.24 1 .09 4.36 0.73 4.3 1 0.70 4.74 1 .01 Disorder 
Post 4.32 0.89 4.83 1 .34 4.43 1 .04 5.24 1 .41 4.82 1 .41 4.61 1 .06 4.70 1 .22 
Reliable 
Pre 4.91 0.97 4.43 1 .41 4.48 1 .20 4.33 1 .56 4.48 1 .45 4.58 1 . 1 8  4.54 1 .30 Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 
Post 4.55 1 . 14  4.30 1 .49 4.78 1 .57 4.71 1 .65 4.21 1 .70 4.88 1 . 1 7  4.58 1 .46 
Honest 
Pre 5 .14 1 .08 5.00 1 .41 4.83 1 . 19 5 . 10 1 . 18 4.82 1 .27 5 . 16 1 . 1 5  5.01 1 .21 Disorder x Gender 
Post 4.95 1 .25 5.09 1 . 16  5.00 1 .09 5 .14 1 .49 5.23 1 .37 4.90 1 . 1 1  5.05 1 .23 Deliberation x Gender 
Sympathy 
Pre 6.05 0.95 6.26 1 . 1 8  5.61 1 .37 6.00 1 .07 5.85 1 .29 6.08 I .OS 5.98 1 . 16 
Post 5.77 1 .02 6.13 0.97 5.74 0.96 5.36 1 .29 5.63 1 . 1 7  5.86 1 .01 5.76 1 .08 
Valuable 
Pre 4.64 1 .33 5.35 1 .23 5.04 1 .26 4.85 1 .52 5.03 1 .37 4.94 1 .33 5.00 1 .34 
Post 4.64 1 .36 5.39 1 .47 5 . 17 1 .33 5.05 1 .71 5 .31 1 .49 4.88 1 .45 5.o7 1 .48 
Crime 
Serious 
Pre 6.41 0.80 6. 1 7  1 . 15  6.26 1 . 1 8  6.36 0.79 6.15 1 .08 6.42 0.91 6.30 0.99 
Post 6.41 0.73 6. 1 7  1 .43 6.22 1 .20 5.82 1 . 14 5.88 1 . 1 8  6.38 1 . 10  6.16 1 . 1 6  
Impact 
Pre 5.59 1.30 5.65 1 .40 5.65 1 .37 5.67 1 .02 5.59 1 .20 5.68 1 .32 5.64 1 .26 
Post 5.55 1 .30 5.30 1 .66 5.74 1 .01 5.43 1 . 16  5.54 1 .29 5.48 1 .31 5 .51 1 .30 
Responsible 
Pre 2.09 1 . 1 5  2.22 1 .56 1 .48 0.90 2.23 1 .69 2.08 1 .46 1 .94 1 .32 2.00 1 .37 Disorder 
Post 2.09 1 .23 2 .13 1 .74 1 .22 0.42 3.05 2.53 2.40 2.12 1 .88 1 .38 2. 1 1  1 .76 Disorder x Gender 
Defendant 
Guilt 
Pre 4.32 0.95 3.65 1 .37 3.78 1 .54 3.50 1 .57 4.03 1 .53 3.64 1 .26 3.81 1 .39 Disorder; Deliberation; Gender 
Post 3.32 1 .43 2.22 0.85 3.57 1 .53 4.36 2.01 3.75 1 .88 3.04 1 .42 3.36 1 .67 Disorder x Deliberation 
Sentence 
Pre 2.22 2.86 2.91 3.45 3.39 3.65 2.58 3.24 3.22 3.54 2.43 3.06 2.78 3.29 Deliberation 
Post 2.00 2.96 1 .22 2.65 2.74 3.49 2.04 2.90 2.39 2.89 1 .69 3.iO 2.00 3.01 
Note. Pre and Post indicate pre- and post-deliberation judgements with the main effect for deliberation demonstrated in the Total column. Sentence recommendation ranged from 1-10 years. All other judgements rated 
on a 7- point Likert scale (I= Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree). x=Interaction. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for Judgements of the Victim, Crime and Defendant 
across Victim Disorder, Jury Member Gender and Deliberation 
Item df F p 
Victim 
Likeable 
Disorder 3 2.925 .039* 
Deliberation I 0.054 . 8 17  
Gender I 0.028 .868 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0.075 .973 
Disorder x Gender 3 2.305 .083 
Deliberation x Gender I 0.20 1 .655 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.285 .836 
Reliable 
Disorder 3 0.4 16 .742 
Deliberation 0.0 17 .896 
Gender I 1 .471 .229 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0.696 .557 
Disorder x Gender 3 1 .4 10  .246 
Deliberation x Gender I 3.949 .050 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 3 . 1 87 .028* 
Honest 
Disorder 3 0.228 .877 
Deliberation I 0.0 16 .899 
Gender I 0.003 .959 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0. 128 .944 
Disorder x Gender 3 2.78 1 .046* 
Deliberation x Gender I 5.948 .017* 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 2.066 . 1 1 1  
Sympathy" 
Disorder 3 1 .605 . 1 94 
Deliberation I 2.299 . 1 33 
Gender I 1 .335 .25 1 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 1 .278 .287 
Disorder x Gender 3 0.527 .665 
Deliberation x Gender I 0.229 .634 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 1 .047 .376 
Valuable 
Disorder I 0.628 .430 
Deliberation 3 0.786 .505 
Gender I 0.638 .427 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0.029 .989 
Disorder x Gender 3 0.625 .601 
Deliberation x Gender I 1 .258 . 1 88 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.2 16 .885 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Item df F p 
Crime 
Serious" 
Disorder 3 0. 153  .927 
Deliberation 1 .772 . 1 87 
Gender 1 2.782 .099 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0.858 .466 
Disorder x Gender 3 0.257 .856 
Deliberation x Gender 1 0.483 .489 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.6 12  .609 
Impact 
Disorder 3 '  0. 125 .945 
Deliberation 0.7 1 5  .400 
Gender 1 0.010  .92 1 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0.802 .496 
Disorder x Gender 3 0. 1 85 .906 
Deliberation x Gender 1 0.994 .322 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.754 .523 
Responsible" 
Disorder 3 4.3 16  .007* 
Deliberation 1 0.460 .500 
Gender 1 0. 127 .722 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 1 .728 . 1 68 
Disorder x Gender 3 3 .860 .012* 
Deliberation x Gender 1 0.4 16  .52 1 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.048 .986 
Defendant 
Guilt" 
Disorder 3 6.8 19  .0 1 1  * 
Deliberation 1 5.540 .021 * 
Gender 1 4. 123 .009* 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 0. 1 97 .659 
Disorder x Gender 3 0.705 .552 
Deliberation x Gender 1 6.477 .001 * 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 2. 1 8 1  .096 
Sentenceb 
Disorder 3 0.582 .629 
Deliberation I 4.923 .029* 
Gender 1 2.352 . 129 
Disorder x Deliberation 3 1 .034 .382 
Disorder x Gender 3 0.63 1 .597 
Deliberation x Gender 1 0.004 .950 
Disorder x Deliberation x Gender 3 0.828 .482 
Note. The degrees of freedom for the between subject and within subject error (error df) is 81 unless 
otherwise specified. 
Aerror df= 82. 
Berror df= 84. 
*p<. .05. 
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Figure 1. Perceived reliability of victim: Interaction between victim 's disorder label 
and juror deliberation for male jurors. 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the salient finding in terms of victims ' reliability 
occurred in the context of the depression victim. There was a reversal based on mock 
jurors' gender. Female mock juror's perception of victim's reliability was generally 
higher than for male mock jurors, but it also increased following deliberation while it 
generally decreased for male mock jurors. Single factor ANOVAs were used to 
further investigate the 3-way interaction. The only significant difference was for the 
depression victim, where female mock jurors rated the victim as more reliable after 
deliberation (M = 5 .4) than before (M = 4.3), F( l, 14) = 9.58, p < .005. 
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Figure 2. Perceived reliability of victim: Interaction between victim 's disorder label 
and juror deliberation for female jurors. 
In relation to honesty, there was a significant interaction between disorder and 
gender (,/ = .065). The interaction between disorder and gender is illustrated in 
Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3. Perceived honesty of victim: Interaction of victim 's disorder label and 
juror's gender. 
Post hoc HSD tests showed that there were no significant differences across 
disorders for males, or for females. The results of single factor ANOV As indicated 
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that there were no significant differences between male and female jurors for the 
victims with different disorder labels. However, for the schizophrenia victim the 
difference between males and females approached significance, F(l ,2 1 )  = 4.30, 
p = .05 1 .  The interaction between deliberation and gender is illustrated in Figure 4 
below. 
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Figure 4. Perceived honesty of victim: Post hoc analysis of deliberation and gender 
interaction. 
There was also a significant interaction between deliberation and gender (,/ = 
.0 1 9). Here, male jurors provided lower honesty scores before deliberation than after. 
Conversely, female jurors provided higher honesty scores before deliberation than 
after, creating a cross-over effect. 
Crime 
There were no significant effects on the seriousness of the crime, or its impact 
on the victim, but in respect of responsibility assigned to the victim there was a 
significant main effect for disorder (,/ = .09 1 ), and a significant interaction between 
disorder and gender (,/ = .082). When the ANOV A results for responsibility were 
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evaluated at a more stringent significance level of .025 to take account of the 
increased risk of Type 1 error due to non-homogeneity of variance and covariance 
matrices, these effects were still significant. Jurors perceived the intellectual 
disability victim (M = 2.63) to be more responsible for the incident than control group 
(M = 2.09), and schizophrenia (M = 2.17) victims. However, post hoc tests revealed 
that the only significant difference was between the intellectual disability and 
depression victims (p_ < .01). The interaction between disorder and gender is 
illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5. Perceived responsibility of victim: Interaction of victim 's disorder label and 
juror 's gender 
Post hoc HSD tests revealed no significant differences for victims with 
different disorder labels for male jurors. However, female jurors regarded the 
intellectual disability victim (M = 3.31, p < .05) as significantly more responsible 
than the control (M = 2.16, p < .05), schizophrenia and depression victims (means of 
1 .4 1  and 1.27 respectively, p < .001 ). The results of single factor ANOVAs further 
indicated that the only significant gender difference occurred for the schizophrenia 
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victim. Male jurors assigned significantly higher responsibility to the schizophrenia 
victim, F(l ,21) = 6.73, p <. 05, than did female jurors (M = 1.41). 
Defendant 
There were significant main effects across victim's disorder label (.,/ = .076), 
juror gender (.,/ = .042) and deliberation (.,/ = .018) in respect of defendant 's guilt and 
significant interaction between disorder and deliberation (.,/ = .062). Overall, 
deliberation caused a decrease in the perceived guilt of the defendant (pre and post 
means of 3 . 81 and 3.36 respectively). Male jurors agreed more that the defendant was 
guilty than did female jurors (means of 3 . 89 and 3.34 respectively) . Post hoc analysis 
(HSD) of the main effect for disorder showed that the jurors agreed less that the 
defendant was guilty in the case of the schizophrenia victim (M = 2. 93) when 
compared to the depression victim (M = 3.67, p < .05), and the intellectual disability 
victim (M = -3.93, p < .001). However again it was deliberation that had an important 
role in shaping these perceptions as shown in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6. Perceived guilt of the defendant: Interaction between victim 's disorder label 
and deliberation. 
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As shown in Figure 6, the assignment of defendant guilt was consistent across 
all disorder labels prior to deliberation. However deliberation had an effect in 
lowering the perceived guilt of the defendant when the victim was not labelled (pre 
and post means of 4.32 and 3.32 respectively), F( l ,22) = 12.83, p < .01. But the 
greatest decrease in perceived guilt of the defendant occurred after deliberation in the 
case of the schizophrenia victim (means of 3.65 and 2.22), F(l ,21) = 26.27, p = .001. 
Post hoc analyses (HSD) showed no significant differences across victim disorder 
labels prior to deliberation. However, after deliberation the defendant in the 
schizophrenia victim case was perceived as significantly less guilty, than in the case 
of the depression victim (p < .05) and the control victim (p < .01). 
Finally, in respect of sentence, there was a significant main effect for 
deliberation (.,/ = .013). Length of sentence assigned to the defendant significantly 
decreased after deliberation (means of 2.78 and 2.00 respectively). However, when 
this result was evaluated at a more stringent significance level of .025 to take account 
of the increased risk of Type 1 error due to non-homogeneity of variance and 
covariance matrices, it failed to reach significance. 
Qualitative 
The qualitative data was structured and discussed with reference to the main three 
research questions, namely how: 
• Mental disorder labelling influence juror deliberations and judgements relating to 
the victim's affective characteristics, and the juror perception of the crime and 
defendant guilt and sentence; 
• Jury deliberations would change the decisions and opinions of the jurors and; 
• Individual juror gender influences the decisions and opinions of the jurors. 
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When the time invested in the different themes is taken into consideration it 
appears that the jurors mainly confined their deliberation to six different aspects of the 
vignette. These were; the victim, the defendant, the witness, the evidence, assignment 
of guilt, and the crime. A further category was labelled as miscellaneous and 
contained comments that either did not pertain to the case or did not fit into any one 
category. The amount of time spent discussing each of the aspects of the crime can be 
seen below, in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Time Spent (%) Discussing Different Aspects of the Crime During Deliberation 
Control Schizophrenia Depression Intellectual Mental Disorder Overall 
Category Disability Average Average 
Victim 5.6 29.6 23.7 32.8 28.7 22.9 
Defendant 1 9.9 1 1 .0 6.2 6.5 7.9 1 0.9 
Witness 2.3 4.9 4.3 1 .3 3.5 3.2 
Evidence 42.3 16 . 1  2 1 .3 23.0 20. l 25.7 
Guilt 2 1 .5 22.7 29.2 25.3 25.7 24.7 
Crime 1 .9 4.0 8.0 1 .6 4.5 3.9 
Miscellaneous 6.5 1 1 .7 7.4 9.8 9.6 8.9 
Note. Mental Disorder Average is the average of Schizophrenia, Depression and Intellectual Disability. 
As expected the juries who were participating in one of the mental disorder 
conditions (schizophrenia, depression, intellectual disability) spent notably more time 
discussing the victim, victim characteristics, behaviour and the victim's credibility 
(average 28.7%) when compared to the control group (no label) who spent only 5.6% 
of the total deliberation time discussing the victim (see Table 4). The reverse was true 
for the discussion relating to the defendant. The juries in the mental disorder 
conditions spent an average of 7.9% of their time discussing defendant characteristics, 
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behaviour and credibility whereas the juries in the control condition spent 19.9% 
conferring about the same aspects. 
In relation to the witnesses, it should be noted that all juries focused on the 
man who observed the incident, and a much lesser extent on the flatmate of the 
defendant, but did not consider the other witnesses featured in the court case ( e.g. 
police woman). This was irrespective of the condition the jurors had been 
participating in, as the time spent was similar in all conditions, though somewhat less 
in the intellectual disability condition (1.3%) as compared to the overall average for 
all four conditions (3.2%) or to schizophrenia (4.9%), depression (4.3%) or control 
(2.3%). It is possible that this finding can be explained by a preference on the part of 
the jurors' for more direct evidence over less direct evidence. 
The evidence in the case was something on which the jurors paid a relatively 
large amount of time to. Themes that emerged included the lack of forensic evidence, 
the allegedly stolen watch, the need for additional evidence in order to convict the 
defendant, and the circumstantial evidence used during the trial. In all juries, 
comments were made in relation to the ambiguous evidence presented and the need 
for more hard evidence. Jurors in the schizophrenia condition spent the shortest 
amount of time deliberating on the evidence (16.1 %) followed by the depression 
condition (21.3%) and the intellectual disability condition (23.0 %) with an overall 
average for the mental disorder conditions of 20.1 %. For the control group however, 
participants appeared to pay more attention to the evidence spending a total of 42.3% 
of their deliberation time discussing evidence related matters. 
Assigning guilt was another aspect that the jurors considered important when 
deliberating. Several themes emerged involving the defendant and the degree of guilt 
that could be assigned. Guilt assigned appeared to be closely tied to the perceived 
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credibility of the victim, the defendant and the witnesses. It was also connected to the 
perceived reliability of the evidence, as well as the amount of evidence going against 
the defendant. Several juries discussed at length their views that the defendant was 
indeed guilty but that there was not enough evidence to convict him. There did not 
appear to be any major difference between the mental disorder groups and the control 
groups on this issue. Jurors in the depression condition spent the longest time 
discussing guilt followed by intellectual disability condition and schizophrenia and 
finally the control group. The overall average time spent amounted to 24. 7% of the 
total deliberation time. 
The crime per se was evidently not judged to be of specific importance to the 
jurors. The fact that it was a rape crime and what this means to the victim was 
mentioned in a few juries, but still did not seem to merit much deliberation time. 
Instead the jurors appeared to focus more on the presented evidence and the 
credibility of all the involved individuals. This is illustrated by the limited time spent 
discussing the type of the crime, with jurors in the schizophrenia condition spending 
4% of total deliberation time, as compared to depression condition (8.0%), intellectual 
disability condition (1.6%) and the control condition (1.9%). The average for the four 
conditions amounted to 3.9%, with the average of the mental disorder conditions 
somewhat higher (4.5%). 
The final category, miscellaneous, consisted of instances when the jurors did 
not discuss issues relevant to the present study. This mainly included crimes in 
general and opinions attached to those, as well as comparisons between other crimes 
featured in the media and the present study. The jurors in the schizophrenia condition 
seemed to make use of such comparisons somewhat more (11.7%) than the other 
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conditions (intellectual disability, 9.8%; depression, 7.4%; control, 6.5%). The overall 
average time spent by the four conditions amounted to 8.9%. 
For the purposes of the present study, it was of interest to further analyse the 
individual and group perceptions the jurors had of the victim. In particular, it was 
important to find out if the labelling of the victim with a mental disorder influenced 
the jury deliberation. The results from the qualitative analysis supported the 
quantitative analysis, suggesting that the jurors were indeed influenced by the 
psychiatric label given to the victim. The qualitative analysis both confirmed the 
quantitative results and added information that would not otherwise have been 
obtained. The relevant findings from each mental disorder condition will be discussed 
next. 
Schizophrenia 
Results from the qualitative analysis of the victim suffering from 
schizophrenia indicated that the jurors had many questions about this condition. 
However, though it was evident that some jurors had very limited knowledge about 
the disorder, many of them still held negative attitudes and opinions regarding people 
suffering from the disorder. For example; 
Juror JA: The information sheet states that she has got schizophrenia, 1 think we 
should take that into consideration. 
Juror 1 B: ls she on medications? if so, she could be sort of normal, right? 
Juror JC: We don 't know that. 
Juror 1 D: if she was schizophrenic, and not on medication, it would tip the balance 
for me. 1 wouldn 't believe her story. 
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Juror IA: Yes, it is too vague, she supposedly can 't remember a thing. It 's a bit suss if 
you ask me. 
Furthermore, jurors who demonstrated a strong attitude about the disorder 
were likely to make strong judgements about the victim, in particular in relation to her 
credibility as a witness. For example, they were also likely to strongly criticise the 
actions and behaviour of the victim, especially during the events leading up to the 
trial. Comments made by jurors ranged from questioning why she had delayed 
reporting the crime for so long to harsh statements that the victim "obviously wasn't 
entirely there" Gury 3). In general strong judgements were made in relation to the 
disorder and some participants commented that they believed that "schizophrenics are 
quite mentally disturbed" Gury 2). They further described the behaviour of people 
with schizophrenia as erratic Gury 2). 
It became clear that a number of participants believed that the testimony given 
by the victim was less than credible due to her disorder. This is illustrated by 
statements made by participants in jury 2: 
Juror 2C: Well, I would not have believed her had it not been for the eyewitness. She 
was a schizophrenic and easily could have made it all up. 
Juror 2E: Yeah, I think so too. She has no evidence anyway. 
Juror 2F: Look, she is a crazy chick who cannot be seen as reliable, and her 
delusions could quite easily lead her to telling stories that were not true. 
Juror 2A: I feel sorry for her, but I guess we don 't know if she was on meds and if she 
wasn 't I don 't think she was reliable 
Other jurors voiced concerns about the mental state of the victim at the 
time of the crime, stating for example that she might not have been stable and if this 
was the case, an innocent man may end up in prison because of it Gury 1 ). 
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Though some jurors appeared to be negatively inclined towards the victim due to her 
disorder and judged her quite harshly because of it, other participants seemed willing 
to be more lenient in their treatment of the victim, due to her mental disorder. This 
was particularly so when discussing the fact that the victim did not report the incident 
for two weeks. While some participants strongly questioned why this was the case, for 
example juror 3A stated "why didn't she report it though, I mean two weeks . . .  ", 
others appeared more sympathetic. For example, jurors 3B, G and D respectively 
made the following comments: 
Juror 3B: She obviously didn 't have a conviction on her mind then, I don 't understand 
why she showered and got rid of her clothes and stuff either. 
Juror 3G: A rape is the worst fear of a woman and I think your instinct is to wash 
yourself And she said she was scared so that is why she didn 't report it. 
Juror 3D: Mmmm, she was schizophrenic. . .  her mind may have wavered, it [the 
attack] may have gone out of her mind if she is schizophrenic. When it came back she 
reported it. 
Most Jurors m the cohort, seemed aware of that most people with 
schizophrenia are prescribed medication. This led many participants to believe that 
the victim may have been stable, especially since no deviant behaviour was displayed 
by the victim in court Gury 2). However, it still led to some discussion. While some 
participants assumed that the victim was on medication since she didn 't sound erratic, 
othersbelievedthis could not be taken for granted and stated that "if she is not on meds 
nothing she has said can be automatically taken as true. It may be true in her mind, but 
not in reality" Gury 3). After some debate about whether or not the victim was on 
medication, it appeared that the general consensus was that she probably was. 
Coupled with the perceived normal behaviour of the victim, this appeared to lead the 
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majority of the participants to the conclusion that the mental disorder did not have an 
effect on the victim. One participant Gury 1) remarked that "she is holding down a 
job, she must be normal". As the victim's behaviour was inconsistent with the 
participants' perceptions of people with schizophrenia, the jurors focused on legal 
facts of the case and did not seem to make any specific allowances for the victim's 
mental disorder. It appeared that although they had stereotypes about the behaviour of 
a person with schizophrenia, especially in relation to reliability, their final verdict was 
largely based on the presented evidence. However, given that the quantitative results 
indicated some bias, it can not necessarily be assumed be that victims with 
schizophrenia are treated without bias, even when their behaviour is perceived as 
normal. 
Depression 
Participants viewing the victim with depression seemed less critical of her 
actions and behaviour than did the participants exposed to the schizophrenia 
condition. In general it appeared that people had a better understanding of what 
depression meant compared to the other disorders and that they were more supportive 
of this victim. One participant Gury 4) stated that "just because she was depressed 
doesn't mean she was bawling her eyes out all the time", indicating that even when a 
person is depressed, the person acts rationally. Participants expressed sympathy for 
the victim and one individual reported during the debrief session that although the 
group had not openly discussed the disorder during the deliberation, it was clear that 
the jurors did feel for the victim Gury 5, male) and thereby treated her with more 
consideration than they would have treated someone without depression. Another 
aspect of the deliberation that seem to indicate some amount of sympathy for the 
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victim were the large number of jurors who stated that their gut instinct told them that 
the defendant was guilty, but that regrettably there was not enough evidence to 
convict him. The number of participants who voiced opinions as illustrated by the 
following : "I think he may be guilty, but there is not evidence to support a conviction" 
Oury 5) was notably higher in the depression condition than compared to the other 
conditions. Furthermore, the disorder was used as a rationale for the inability of the 
victim to report the crime at an earlier stage and to explain why she burned her 
clothes. Comments such as "she was depressed, we can't know how she would react 
to this episode" Oury 4, female) and "she was traumatised on top of the depression, so 
she didn't report it straight away, I don't think that makes her less credible, it only 
makes it more difficult for the police to solve the crime" Oury 6, male), seem to 
suggest compassion and empathy for the victim based on her disorder . 
Some bias was however shown, even with the greater understanding of the 
disorder. When discussing the inability of the victim to provide a positive , 
identification of the attacker, some jurorsbelievedsince the victim was depressed it 
was "possible that she [victim] was unable to identify him due to depression and some 
stress" Oury 6). It seemed that these jurors considered that the victim would be unable 
to focus on the situation due to her depression. Furthermore, it was suggested by one 
juror that the victim may have made the whole incident up: "She is depressed, she 
may be making this thing up in order to get attention" Oury 5). 
As in the schizophrenia condition, the victim's behaviour was perceived to be 
normal. Participants indicated that they did not consider that she acted depressed but 
rather that the victim seemed coherent, as illustrated by the excerpts below: 
Juror 4A: They said she was depressed. Why was that brought up? 
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Juror 4B: I think/or us to assume that this was the reason she waited for two weeks to 
report the incident. 
Juror 4E: I don 't know, she didn 't seem depressed to me, she seemed coherent, maybe 
a bit anxious, but that would be normal. 
Juror 4D: And depression was never mentioned in cross examination either. 
Juror 4B: She didn 't seem depressed to me, but it was difficult to say since we 
couldn 't see her facial expression. 
The fact that the face of the victim was blocked out on the tape was mentioned 
by participants in the different mental disorder conditions, however it was more 
salient in the depression condition, and may be linked to a general belief that people 
with depression are emotional, look sad and are prone to burst into tears at all times. 
However, women seemed less inclined to believe this was the case, as exemplified by 
a comment made by one female juror Oury 6) stating that "just because she is 
depressed doesn't mean that she will be bawling her eyes out all of the time'1 and 
other female jurors echoed this sentiment. After the deliberation, the general 
consensus in the juries seemed to be that the victim was not displaying any unusual 
behaviour and should therefore be treated like any other victim. This is, however, 
inconsistent with the results from the quantitative findings, which indicate that the 
agreement on defendant guilt was higher in this condition. It therefore appears that the 
sympathy felt for this victim may have influenced their decision. 
Intellectual Disability 
Participants viewing the intellectual disability condition did not perceive the 
victim to display any unusual behaviour. In fact several jurors commented that the 
victim sustained employment, lived independently and appeared to function well. 
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Others did not consider that she acted like a person with an intellectual disability. One 
another participant Gury 9, female) expressed the view that "in the end it [the 
disability] didn't matter as she [the victim] did not come across as having a 
disability", perhaps indicating that if the victim had acted as if she had a disability, 
she would have received special treatment. Some jurors further stated that the speech 
of the victim was also normal suggesting that they held the generalised belief that all 
individuals with an intellectual disability have speech difficulties. Additionally, one 
participant Gury 8) commented that she felt somewhat confused, as "the sheet said 
that she [the victim] was disabled, but she [the victim] came across as confident and 
not anxious". It appeared that although none of the jurors defined what they perceived 
as typical behaviour displayed by people with intellectual disabilities, the victim's 
behaviour was not consistent with their perceptions of such behaviour. 
Special treatment due to the disorder of the victim was also discussed. This is 
exemplified by the following excerpt from the deliberation of jury 7. 
Juror 7 A: So we know she is disabled, does that mean we should have more sympathy 
with the victim? 
Juror 7B: No I don 't think so. 
Juror 7C: Yeah, I agree with you [juror 7B], a victim is a victim. We shouldn 't make 
any special allowances for her I don 't think. 
Juror 7D: Well, I reckon some people may feel more sympathetic . .. She 's retarded 
after all. 
Juror 7 A:  Yes, exactly! But at the same time others may feel less sympathetic, they 
may feel she is not worth as much, seeing as she has a disability. 
Juror 7E: You know if she had acted like she was intellectually disabled, it may have 
affected the outcome more. She seemed normal to me. 
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Juror 7A: I think I would have missed it [the intellectual disability] if they hadn 't 
mentioned it on the sheet, cause she didn 't come across as disabled. If she had acted 
differently, it may have affected the way I saw her as a witness. 
It further appeared that participants made strong judgements in relation to the 
honesty of the victim based on the perceived normal behaviour. As they did not view 
the victim as disadvantaged, some participants seemed to feel that the gaps in her 
testimony could be due to lies or exaggerations and that she was less honest. 
Juror 9A: She seems perfectly normal, I mean listen to her talk, it is not simple stuff 
and you can understand her fine. 
Juror 9B: It states here that she has an intellectual disability though. 
Juror 9A: But she doesn 't act like it. 
Juror 9C: Seems ok to me. 
Pause 
Juror 9C: Maybe I am mean, but her story isn 't exactly waterproof I think she is 
making it sound worse than it was. 
Juror 9A: Yes, for compensation maybe? 
Juror 9B: There is no evidence, she claims she got rid of it all, why did she do that? 
What if there wasn 't anything wrong with her clothes? 
However, there appeared to be no consensus about whether the victim was 
lying or not though there appeared to be a gender difference on this matter. This 
finding was supported by the quantitative data, which indicated a significant gender 
difference on perceived honesty. 
8 1  
Process 
In general, the qualitative analysis showed that even though the participants 
were given clear jury instructions before commencing the deliberation phase, 
instructions that were directing them to base their decision on evidence and the 
balance of probabilities principle, no consensus in regards to whether the victim' s  
mental disorder should be taken into consideration was found. Several jurors 
considered the victim's mental disorder was relevant, whereas others considered that 
no special considerations should be made due to the disorder. Furthermore, jurors 
with strong opinions and attitudes regarding the mental disorder appeared to influence 
the rest of the jury, reinforcing and in some cases polarising the opinions of the 
members of the jury, as illustrated by the excerpt below. 
Juror IA: Well, I still believe we are missing something here, she has schizophrenia 
after all. That influences her reliability if you ask me. 
Juror 1 C: I think he [1 A J has a point here. 
Juror 1 B: NO! Look at her, she acts and tallcs normal, she is obviously on medication 
and that would make her story believable. 
Juror 1 D: No one has told us she is on meds you know . . . .  I think 1 A might be right. 
It should further be noted that the jurors spent a relatively high proportion of 
their time debating about the victim and perceived victim characteristics and that the 
mental disorder came into play although it is not a legal fact and was never mentioned 
at all during the proceedings shown to the participants. At the same time, they did not 
appear to apply similar time to discussing the defendant, although the defendant was 
the individual whose guilt they were required to determine. 
Another salient finding relating to the interpretation of the jury instructions 
during the deliberation was that for the control condition participants appeared to 
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adhere to the instructions much more strictly than for the mental disorder conditions. 
In the control groups, time was spent trying to understand exactly what the 
instructions meant. Many questions were raised this way, such as, "who has the 
burden of proof' Oury 1 O); "isn't a person innocent until proven guilty" Oury 10); "do 
we have enough proof for balance of probabilities" Oury 11 ). However even in these 
instances, in trying to understand what the instructions meant, the jurors often brought 
in their own interpretations and thoughts as illustrated by the following comment, I 
believe justice should prevail, and that means we should not only look at the evidence, 
but also use our heads and figure out what was really going on Oury 11 ). 
Another aspect of the control condition that was salient was the fact that 
considerably less time was spent discussing the victim and the defendant. Instead, the 
participants seemed to focus on the available evidence and the question of guilt. 
However, a large proportion of the jurors perceived the defendant in a negative light, 
although they all considered that there was not enough evidence to convict him. 
Comments illustrating this include; "I have a gut feeling that he is guilty, but there 
just isn't enough evidence to support it" Oury 4) and "The defendant is shifty, but we 
can't convict him" Oury 5) to "He certainly seems dodgy" Oury 9). It is hypothesised 
that this attitude could be due to the nature of the crime or the fact that there were 
many women in the juries. Another aspect of the defendant behaviour that was 
discussed in one jury was his perceived levels of anger. It was stated that the 
defendant seemed very angry even before he was questioned. This was interpreted by 
one juror as follows; "I think you would be angry too, if you were innocent" Oury 4). 
The jurors agreed that he seemed angry and appeared to be more inclined to believe 
the defendants account of events after having discussed this perceived demonstration 
of emotions. 
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The qualitative analysis established some misunderstanding of the question 
relating to length of sentence in the questionnaire. While the item in the questionnaire 
relating to sentence, requested the participants to assign a sentence to the defendant 
should they find him guilty of the crime, some participants believed they were 
required to assign a sentence even when not believing the defendant was guilty. As 
most jurors agreed that there was not enough evidence to convict the defendant they 
concluded they could not assign a long sentence. This is demonstrated by the 
following comment; "If he was found guilty, I would give him the maximum penalty, 
but we can't convict him so I will have to keep it lower" Oury 1 ). 
A final issue that emerged during the deliberation was the influence the 
participants had on each other. There were many examples of individual jurors who 
did believe that the defendant was guilty, but when they found that the majority did 
not believe this was the case, they were swayed by the majority and changed their 
mind. This was particularly the case when some of the other jurors held strong 
contrary opinions, when there was a clear group leader or when the juror considered 
that the evidence was ambiguous. Comments such as; "I think the defendant is suss 
but I can't back it up so I guess he is not guilty" Oury 10) and "I am not one hundred 
percent sure he did it, but speaking to you has brought me more towards the middle" 
Oury 11) demonstrate this phenomena. 
It is also interesting to observe that although there were no instructions 
directing the participants to choose a foreperson, several juries spontaneously did so 
of their own volition, with the foreperson usually being the person who made the 
suggestion. Forepersons also tended to be male and or have experience of prior jury 
duty. 
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One interesting finding emerging in all experiments was a tendency to criticise 
the victim for her behaviour, as illustrated by a comment made by a juror in the 
schizophrenia condition; "Why didn't she report it though? I mean two weeks" Gury 
3). There also appeared to be a gender difference in the qualitative data with males 
being more critical than females in their perceptions of the victim, her actions and 
behaviour. 
Overall, both genders were negatively inclined towards the labelled victim, 
irrespective of the condition, with many participants stating that the victim was not 
displaying any emotion and that this is turn made them think she was not telling the 
truth. The perceived lack of emotion made the victim less believable and credible as a 
witness to the jurors. These jurors seemed to make stronger judgements about the 
actions of the victim, such as the fact that she burned her clothes, took a shower and 
waited two weeks before reporting the incident. 
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Discussion 
Research in the area of jury decision making has demonstrated that there are a 
number of factors that function as extralegal variables in the courtroom (see for 
example Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Hymes et al., 1993; MacCoun, 1990; Erian et 
al., 1998; Dean et al., 2000). Personal characteristics of individuals that appear to 
function as extralegal variables include physical attractiveness (Bagby, Parker, 
Rector, & Kalemba, 1994; Barnett & Field, 1978; Erian, Lin, Patel, Neal & 
Geiselman, 1998; Leventhal & Krate, 1977; Stewart, 1984), race (Barnett & Field, 
1978; Dean, Holliday-Wayne, Mack, & Thomas, 2000; Gordon, Bindrim, McNicholas 
& Walden, 1988; Hymes, Leinhart, Rowe, & Rogers, 1993; Poli, 2004; Willis, 1992), 
gender (Bull Kovera, McAuliff & Herbert, 1999; ForsterLee, Horowitz, ForsterLee, 
ForsterLee & McGovern, 1999; Guy & Edens, 2003) and socio-economic status ( 
Deitz & Byrnes, 1981 ). Given the substantial body of research that suggests that 
being labelled as mentally ill may lead to negative bias in everyday life (e.g. Link, 
1987; Martin, Pescosolido & Tuch, 2000; Rosenfield, 1997; Reber, 1995; Wolff, 
Pathare, Craig, & Leff, 1996; Wilson, Nairn, Coverdale & Panapa, 2000), it was 
surprising to find no published literature that has examined whether such a label could 
function as an extralegal variable. The main aim of this study was therefore to 
determine whether this is the case, specifically focussing on the mental disorder label 
of the victim. 
Also, as it is known that the gender of the jury member is an extralegal 
variable (Guy & Edens, 2003) and that there are gender differences in attitudes to 
charges of sexual offences (Cowan, 2000), the research design took gender into 
account. The design also took the influence of the deliberation process into account 
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because research findings indicate that this has an effect on jury members' individual 
perceptions (McCoy, Nunez, & Dammeyer, 1999; London & Nunez, 2000). 
These aims were pursued by measuring the effect different mental disorder 
labels (schizophrenia, depression and intellectual disability) and a control group (no 
label), gender of jury members, and the deliberation process have on juries' 
perception of the victim, the crime and the defendant. To triangulate the quantitative 
findings a qualitative analysis was undertaken of the deliberation process, primarily to 
examine whether the participants gave socially acceptable responses when they 
completed the questionnaires, but also to provide a deeper understanding of the 
quantitative findings. 
Overall the results of the study indicate that the jurors generally perceived 
the victim, irrespective of condition, in a fairly positive light. They appeared to feel 
compassion for her and for what happened to her. Although many jurors were critical 
about the victim's ability to recount the event and were reluctant to convict the 
defendant of the crime with which he had been charged, they did not hold the victim 
responsible for what had happened to her. The crime was further perceived as a 
serious incident, which was not acceptable in our society and the jurors generally 
acknowledged that it had had a large impact on the victim, causing her great distress. 
However, due to the victim's inability to provide detail and the lack of forensic 
evidence, the jurors displayed notable indecision about defendant guilt, many of them 
stating that though they had a gut feeling that the defendant was indeed guilty, there 
was no proof to support it. Perhaps given the consequences of their decision, a 
number of jurors found it difficult to render a guilty verdict. The indecision in relation 
to guilt also carried over to the assigned sentence, in that the jurors were hesitant to 
assign long sentences when they considered there was a lack of evidence, even though 
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the questionnaire clearly asked them to assign a sentence only if they thought the 
defendant was guilty. Furthermore, though many acknowledged that the intention had 
been rape, the rape was disrupted and as such should only be rated as an attempted 
rape, warranting a lower sentence. 
The findings in respect of the research questions will now be discussed under 
the headings mental disorder label, deliberation and jury member's gender. 
Mental Disorder Label 
There were no significant mental disorder label effects for the victim 
variables sympathy and valuable, the crime variables serious and impact on victim, 
and the defendant variable sentence. In respect of all the other variables there were 
some significant effects, but the jury members did not consistently express a positive 
or negative bias against any specific victim. 
Control Group Victim 
There were not many or consistent differences in how the jury members 
perceived the control group victim with no label and those with mental disorder 
labels. An examination of the differences demonstrates that the control group victim 
was perceived as less likable than the intellectually disabled victim. This suggests 
that there is a negative bias towards the control group victim, but the finding that 
female jurors regarded the control group victim as less responsible for the crime than 
the intellectual disability victim suggests a positive bias towards the control group 
victim on the part of females. Overall there seems to be a slight negative bias towards 
the control group victim. 
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Schizophrenia Victim 
An indication of positive bias towards the schizophrenia victim is the finding 
that female jurors regarded her as less responsible for the crime than the intellectually 
disabled victim. Female jurors may have considered people suffering from 
schizophrenia cannot generally be held responsible for their behaviour due to their 
disorder, and thus that the victim was not responsible for the incident. Previous 
research by Pescosolido et al. (1999) indicated that people suffering from mental 
disorders are viewed as less competent, supporting the finding of the current study 
that individuals suffering from schizophrenia may be viewed as less responsible for 
the occurred incident. Individuals suffering from schizophrenia may experience 
hallucinations and delusions, which could affect their reliability as witnesses. While 
the jurors perceived the schizophrenia victim as the least reliable witness, this rating 
was not significantly different from the reliability ratings of the other victims. 
However the results in respect of guilt suggest a negative bias towards the 
schizophrenia victim. Post-deliberation the defendant was rated as less guilty in the 
case of the schizophrenia victim than in the case of the depression and intellectual 
disability victims. 
While these results appear somewhat contradictory, the responsibility, or lack 
of responsibility, of the victim is not necessarily directly related to the verdict. Overall 
there is slightly more evidence of a negative than a positive bias towards the 
schizophrenia victim. 
Depression Victim 
The finding that participants perceived the depression victim as less likeable 
than the intellectually disabled victim indicates a negative bias towards the former. 
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The qualitative analysis also seemed to suggest that some jurors considered 
individuals with depression were difficult to be around, as they were often sad, devoid 
of energy and generally pessimistic in their outlook on life. A few jurors further 
voiced opinions indicative of their lack of understanding of the difficulties arising 
from depression. Instead they were of the opinion that an individual with depression 
should and could snap out of it. This finding is also in accordance with the 
conclusions of the Mental disorder Institute of Victoria in 2004. These juror attitudes 
may have lowered likeability scores assigned to the depression victim, as it is possible 
that the depressed person will not be seen as a very likeable person, but instead as 
somewhat of a whiner, if an individual does not understand that depression is a 
disease, but instead attributes the behaviour to the depressed person's personality. 
The finding that female jurors regarded the depression victim as less 
responsible for the crime than the intellectually disabled victim, is indicative of a 
positive bias towards the depression victim. Another indication of such a positive 
bias is that post-deliberation the defendant was judged to be more guilty in the case of 
the depression victim than when the victim was suffering of schizophrenia. 
It is emphasised that the responsibility, or lack of responsibility, of the victim 
1s · not necessarily related to the verdict. Overall, when considering all identified 
affective characteristics there seemed to be a slight positive bias towards the 
depression victim. This is in accordance with a study by Pescosolido et al. (1 999) 
where findings indicated that participants treated mental disorders differentially and 
that they were more sympathetic towards people suffering from depression. 
Intellectual Disability Victim 
There was evidence of a negative bias towards the intellectual disability victim 
in respect of responsibility for the crime, but a positive bias in respect of likeability 
and defendant guilt. While female jurors regarded the intellectual disability victim as 
more responsible for the incident than all the other victims, male and female jurors 
found this victim more likable than the depression and control group victims. Post­
deliberation, the defendant was also regarded as more guilty than in the case of the 
schizophrenia victim. 
The higher likeability of the intellectual disability victim may be a result of a 
commonly accepted stereotype of the intellectually disabled, suggesting that as they 
have a limited cognitive capacity, they are na'ive (Bottoms, Nysse-Carris, Harris, & 
Tyda, 2003), but generally nice enough individuals with a cheerful, loving personality 
(Williams, 1986). The higher defendant guilt rating may partly have originated from 
the high likeability of the victim, making the jurors consider the victim did not 
deserve something so bad to happen to her. 
Overall, when considering all identified affective characteristics, there is 
slightly more evidence of a positive than a negative bias towards the intellectually 
disabled victim. 
Mental Disorder Label as an Extralegal Variable 
The composite findings discussed suggest that a mental disorder label can 
lead to bias among jurors, both positive and negative. This indicates that a mental 
disorder label can function as an extralegal variable. However, as the results in 
respect of the control victim indicate, the presence of a mental disorder label does not 
necessarily lead to a negative bias towards such a victim, relative to the control 
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victim. In fact, the different mental disorder label ( schizophrenia, depression and 
intellectual disability) victims were perceived to differ more from each other than 
from the control group victim with no label. While there was no consistent pattern of 
bias against or in favour of any specific victim, there was slightly more evidence of a 
negative bias than a positive bias towards the control group and schizophrenia 
victims, while the opposite was true for the other victims. 
Theoretically the level of guilt is the most direct indicator of the possibility 
that a mental disorder label functions as an extralegal variable. The level of guilt 
assigned to the defendant in the case of victims with mental disorder labels, did not 
differ significantly from that of the control group victim. This finding suggests that 
there is no bias towards victims with mental disorder labels, when compared to the 
victim without a label, on the measure of defendant guilt. However, after deliberation 
less guilt was assigned to the defendant in the case of the schizophrenia victim, than 
in the case of the depression and intellectual disability victims. The more negative 
bias encountered in the case of schizophrenia may well be a result of the different 
types of disorders chosen for this study. While depression and intellectual disability 
are mental disorders which carry with them some stigma, schizophrenia is perceived 
to be associated with traits of unpredictability and violence (Pescosolido et al., 1999). 
People suffering from schizophrenia are perceived as a danger to society (Phelan et 
al., 2000), and the results of this study, that the jurors were more negatively inclined 
towards a victim suffering from schizophrenia, is consistent with earlier research. In 
the study by Link et al. (1987) it was found that it was not the mental disorder itself, 
but the stereotype that the label invoked that lead to prejudice and discrimination. 
When the stereotype was associated with dangerousness, negative bias was found. As 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders have been shown to be associated with 
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dangerousness and violence (Pescosolido et al., 1999; Phelan et al., 2000) the negative 
bias relating to the schizophrenia victim was expected. 
It is notable that several jurors in those cases where the victim had a mental 
disorder label commented on the fact that she still acted normal and was holding 
down a job, living on her own and generally functioning well. From a legal 
perspective the mental disorder label of a victim is irrelevant, as it is the behaviour 
relevant to the legal proceedings that the jury should focus on. It appears then that in 
spite of the jurors knowing that the decision was of importance for the person being 
judged, and despite having to justify their judgement to their fellow jurors, aspects 
that have been shown to render schemas less influential (Freund et al., 1985; 
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988), there were some 
reliance on mental disorder schemas. The jurors were puzzled by the absence of 
behaviour they expected of a person wit a corresponding mental disorder label is 
therefore strong support for the conclusion that a mental disorder label may serve as 
an extralegal variable. 
Deliberation 
While deliberation had a limited effect on the jury members' perception of the 
victim's reliability and honesty, it did not have a significant effect on the jury 
members' perception of the crime. However, deliberation had a significant effect on 
the guilt rating of the defendant and the recommended sentence. It should be noted 
that there was an increased risk of Type 1 error due to non-homogeneity of variance 
and covariance matrices in respect of the recommended sentence. When the ANOV A 
results were evaluated at a more stringent significance level of .025 to take account of 
this, the deliberation effect failed to reach significance. The lower recommended 
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sentence after the deliberation will be discussed in spite of the increased risk of 
Type I error, as this is supported by other results of the quantitative and qualitative 
investigations in this study, as well as the findings of other researchers. 
In respect of the victim, the effect of deliberation appears to be different for 
male and female jurors, but not in a consistent way. Cross-over effects occurred in the 
honesty and reliability ratings of the victim. While male jurors regarded the victim as 
more honest after deliberation than before, female jurors regarded the victim as less 
honest after deliberation than before. However, contrary to the honesty finding, 
female jurors considered the depression victim as more reliable after deliberation than 
before, while male jurors tended to rate this victim as less reliable after deliberation. 
The qualitative analysis further indicated that deliberation had an important impact on 
the perceived reliability of a rape victim who is labelled with depression. 
The quantitative findings also suggested that deliberation had an impact on the 
outcome of the trial in that it made the jurors more lenient towards the defendant. The 
jurors regarded the defendant as less guilty after deliberation for schizophrenia and 
control group victims, and for all victims recommended a shorter sentence after 
deliberation than before. However, while it was not a significant finding, it is 
interesting to note that for the intellectual disability victim the opposite happened in 
respect of defendant guilt. Here, the perceived guilt increased after deliberation, 
contrasting with the leniency encountered in the schizophrenia and control group. 
While not significant, deliberation also led to leniency in the case of the depression 
condition. 
The post-deliberation guilt rating in the schizophrenia condition was 
significantly lower than in the control group and depression conditions and also 
significantly lower than before deliberation. This suggests that the deliberations 
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brought about a significant negative bias towards the schizophrenia victim. When 
analysing the qualitative material, it was clear that some of the jurors held strong 
negative opinions and attitudes about schizophrenia. As many of these jurors were 
quite vocal, and voiced their opinions the jury it appears that in many cases the other 
jurors, who may not have started out with a specific opinion in the matter, were 
swayed, perhaps in the absence of contrary information. This finding is in accordance 
with what Foley and Piggott (1997) whose results indicated that jurors influenced 
each other and that forepersons in particular were influential on the deliberation 
process. 
It is possible that the decrease in perceived guilt and the length of the assigned 
sentence may be due to the ambiguity of the facts in the case as well as the weak 
evidence. During the deliberation, these factors were discussed at length and the 
individual jurors may have been influenced by others and as than felt less sure about 
guilt post-deliberation. The qualitative analysis indicated that many jurors did not 
believe that there was enough evidence to prove balance of probabilities that the 
defendant was guilty. Prior research has shown that contradictory statements by 
testifying witnesses led to the acquittal of the defendant (Garrett & Cutler, 1996) and 
when evidence presented in a case is weak, it may lead to leniency (Hendry, Schaffer, 
& Peacock, 1989). Deliberation appeared to highlight the weak evidence and the 
contradictions in the witness testimony, thereby having an effect on the verdict and 
the assigned sentence. 
The decrease in perceived guilt and the length of sentence in this study is 
consistent with Izzet and Leginski's (1974) finding that deliberation shifts the verdict 
towards leniency. Qualitative analysis of the deliberation process indicated that the 
discussion heavily influenced individual jury members, especially when some of the 
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jurors present had a strong opinion about the lack of evidence presented in the case or 
when they made strong judgements about the victim. 
Another relevant aspect of the deliberation process is the influence that group 
members had on each other. Findings from the qualitative analysis indicated that 
members of the jury tended to be unwilling to contradict the majority opinion in the 
group. Some jurors would go along with the majority, even when they stated that they 
did not necessarily believe that the defendant was not guilty. This is consistent with a 
large body of research from the social psychology field, where findings have indicated 
that conformity, a type of social influence, leads individuals to change attitudes or 
behaviours in order to adhere to social norms in a specific setting (see for example 
Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). The qualitative analysis further suggested that even 
when jurors were reluctant to change their opinions, their opinions were more likely 
to be mediated by that of the majority. This is illustrated by the following example: 
Juror IA: Well, I still believe we are missing something here, she has schizophrenia 
after all. That influences her reliability if you ask me. 
Juror 1 C: I think he [ 1 A J has a point here. 
Juror 1 B: NO! Look at her, she acts and talks normal, she is obviously on medication 
and that would make her story believable. 
Juror 1 D: No one told us she is on meds you know ... . I think 1 A might be right. 
Pause 
Juror 1 B: Well, I still think she would probably be on medication, but I suppose there 
are some holes in her story. 
A final aspect of the jury deliberation process to be noted was the reliance on, 
and compliance with, the jury instructions. The qualitative analysis indicated that 
jurors in the mental disorder con_ditions adhered less to the instructions, than did the 
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control group juries. This suggests that in the absence of extralegal variables jurors 
may focus on the legally relevant facts of the case and adhere to instructions better, 
even when the evidence presented is ambiguous. It appears that the mental disorder 
label brought confusion to the deliberation process and this is a further indication that 
a mental disorder label may serve as an extralegal variable. Though the participants 
were not in agreement on whether or not the mental disorder should be taken into 
account, considerable time was still used discussing the disorder and its impact on the 
victim, leading them away from the legally relevant facts of the case. However, the 
juries found the defendant not guilty due to the lack of evidence and many jurors 
stated that although theybelievedthe defendant committed the crime, the evidence 
failed to prove balance of probabilities that this was the case. In these instances, it 
seems clear that, despite their discussion of extralegal factors, the jurors ultimately 
adhered to legal instructions. 
These findings are generally inconsistent with the results of Horowitz (1997) 
who investigated compliance with reasonable doubt instructions. He found that juries 
may not be complying with the instructions due to lowered standards for what 
constitutes balance of probabilities. Horowitz hypothesised that the lowered standards 
may be due to increased crime control values in the jurors. In the present study on the 
other hand, the jurors often spent some time discussing what balance of probabilities 
meant and came to the conclusion that even if they thought the defendant may be 
guilty, there was not enough evidence to say that he committed the crime based on the 
balance of probabilities. 
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Gender 
In the present study gender differences were salient, both in the quantitative 
and qualitative analyses. The results of the study present an interesting picture where 
each disorder interacts with affective and cognitive perceptions uniquely in the 
context of gender and deliberation. As the crime selected for the purposes of this 
study was rape, this is perhaps to be expected. Research has shown that there exists a 
gender difference in relation to rape crimes, with men with their cognitive 
predispositions being more accepting of rape myths, whereas women, who often have 
been exposed to rape victims, are less accepting of rape myths (Anderson, Cooper, & 
Okamura, 1997). Even though gender differences can be expected in relation to rape 
crimes, caution is warranted in the interpretation of gender differences in this study, as 
the cell sizes were sometimes very small (see Table 1 ). 
In the current study the most important effects of juror gender were in respect 
of the victim's honesty, her responsibility for the crime and the defendant's guilt. 
Female jurors judged the schizophrenia victim as less responsible for the crime than 
male jurors did. They also tended to rate the schizophrenia victim as more honest 
than did male jurors. Both these findings suggest that a gender bias exists for the 
schizophrenia victim, with female jurors more positive towards this victim than male 
jurors. Furthermore, there was an interaction between gender and deliberation in their 
effect on the honesty rating, with male jurors rating the victim as more honest after 
deliberation than before, while the opposite was true for female jurors. This indicates 
a gender bias, with male jurors slightly more positive toward the victim than female 
jurors after deliberation. It should however be noted that in spite of the significant 
interaction between gender and disorder, and gender and deliberation, the changes in 
honesty ratings were small. 
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Male jurors judged the defendant as more guilty than female jurors did 
indicating a positive bias towards the victim among male jurors. This appears to be 
inconsistent with the findings in sexual offending studies that suggest that males are 
more susceptible to rape myths (Anderson, Cooper & Okamura, 1997) and therefore 
more likely to rate the guilt of a defendant lower than their female counterparts. 
Research has further indicated that men attribute more responsibility to the 
rape victim than do women (Kanekar & Kolsawalla, 1980). The findings in the 
present study suggested a pattern in which male jurors rated the responsibility of the 
schizophrenia victim slightly higher than did the female jurors, thereby partly 
supporting the findings of Kanekar and Kolsawalla. However, these findings may be 
explained by previous research which indicates that when there is a juror defendant 
similarity, in this case male juror- male defendant, jurors may assign a higher level of 
guilt to the defendant, if the juror is a minority in the jury (Kerr et al., 1995). As most 
of the juries had a majority of female jurors, a case can be made that the male jurors 
were in fact a minority. Furthermore, male jurors only assigned more responsibility to 
the schizophrenia victim, not to the control group, depression or intellectually 
disabled victim. As it remains unclear why the schizophrenia victim was deemed 
more responsible for the situation, this is an area which would benefit from more 
investigation. 
Overall, the results indicate that male jurors are more positive towards the 
victim than female jurors. Based on the findings of this study it could be concluded 
that in rape trials, more male than female jurors may benefit female victims, but 
would have adverse effects for a male defendant. 
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Limitations 
The present study had some limitations in its design. Firstly, as with most jury 
studies, the simulation of the trial took place in a laboratory setting. It has been shown 
in previous studies that there is a difference between what participants decide in an 
experimental setting compared to what they decide in a real trial (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 
1991). An additional limitation is the relatively short deliberation time allowed to the 
participants. In a real court-case, jurors deliberate until they reach a verdict. As this 
would be impossible to do in an experiment such as this, a time limit was imposed on 
the participants. This necessarily detracts from the authenticity of the experiment. 
However, given that it is difficult to study actual juries during the deliberation process 
in Australia, studies examining jury decision making are required to use juries in 
laboratory settings. In any event, the design of the current study made it quite 
impractical to use real juries, given the difficulties in finding sexual assault cases with 
the specific mental disorder labels used in this study, and given the additional 
difficulties that would have arisen, for example variable timing of trials. 
Most of the juries in the present study did not contain twelve jurors. This was 
due to jurors signing up for the study, but not presenting on the assigned day. 
However, as noted earlier, given previous research that has shown that the decision 
making process of a jury is not affected when the jury consists of at least six 
individuals (Kerr & MacCoun, 1985) this issue was addressed in this study by having 
a minimum requirement of six jurors. 
A limitation that needs to be considered is the choice of jury instructions. The 
jury instructions used in this study were adapted from a study by MacCoun et al. 
(1988), however, it appears that they had made use of instructions used for civil 
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matters as opposed to criminal matters and as such the wrong set of jury instructions 
were used in this study. 
Another limitation of the present study was the choice of the index crime. As 
the crime of rape was used in this study the findings may be limited to that crime 
(Field, 1979). 
Some skewness and non-normal kurtosis were identified in respect of the 
seriousness of the crime, sympathy towards the victim, the victim's responsibility for 
the crime, and the length of the sentence assigned to the defendant and most of them 
also shared some non-homogeneity of variance and covariance matrices. As indicated 
in the results section, the violation of the normality assumption was not regarded as a 
serious problem, but the violation of the homogeneity assumption caused concern. 
The effect of a more stringent significance level was therefore considered 
Finally, the effect sizes were relatively small in this study, suggesting that the 
association between the independent and dependant variables for the significant main 
and interaction effects were not particularly strong (Cohen, 1988). However, the small 
sample size may also have contributed to the small effect sizes and sample size was a 
particular concern in respect of gender comparisons. 
Future Research 
As the present study is an exploratory study, there is a need for further 
research in several areas. 
First, it appears as if the different mental disorder labels have a differential 
effect on jurors. Both the quantitative and qualitative findings suggest that the 
schizophrenia label leads to the clearest negative bias. The data does not reveal why 
this is the case. It is possible that participants were concerned about the possible 
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effect of symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions and their effect on the 
reliability and honesty of the victim. An alternative explanation is that the 
participants were ignorant about the symptoms of schizophrenia but had a 
preconceived schema for the disorder, which told them that individuals with 
schizophrenia are violent, unpredictable and cannot be trusted. 
Future research should further explore the effect of juror gender and 
specifically what role mental disorder labels play in the gender effects that occur 
during the deliberation process. Such research may clarify whether the direction of 
bias depends critically on stereotypes relating to mental disorders. 
Some important methodological issues to be further considered for future 
research include the possible use of real trial investigations where possible and the 
extension of research to include crimes other than sexual assaults, as it is hard to 
generalise the findings to other cases involving different types of crimes, such as 
murder, assault and robbery (Field, 1979). Also, it may assist future research if larger 
samples were used, in respect of using a larger number of juries and possibly also 
more participants in the juries, ensuring twelve jurors in each jury as well as a larger 
total number of juries. Finally, future research focusing on labelling could benefit 
from using more explicit and clear labels to ensure that participants are aware of the 
specific mental disorder being examined. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study confirm that juror gender may serve as an extralegal 
variable. Juror gender had an impact on the perceived reliability and honesty of the 
victim, responsibility for the crime and the guilt of the defendant, mostly interacting 
with victim disorder label and deliberation. Quantitative findings indicated that 
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overall male jurors were found to be more positive towards the victim than female 
jurors. 
The findings of this study further confirm that the deliberation process 
can change jurors' perceptions of the victim and the defendant. In respect of the 
perceived reliability and honesty of the victim, deliberation interacted with mental 
disorder label and juror gender, and no clear pattern could be discerned. However, 
after deliberation jurors were generally more lenient towards the defendant, rating him 
less guilty than before, and assigning a shorter sentence than before. 
The qualitative analysis of the deliberation process suggested that many 
jurors had limited knowledge about the different disorders, but that they nevertheless 
often held strong opinions about mentally disordered people. In particular, they 
considered that people suffering from mental disorders behave in a distinct way and 
when the victim portrayed in the study did not behave according to their stereotype, 
the jurors believed they should not show her any special consideration. It was clear 
that stereotypes influenced the discussion and that jurors with strong opinions were 
able to influence the rest of the jury. 
The fact that the jurors invested relatively much time in discussing why the 
victims with labels did not present with the behaviour they expected and were 
functioning well in everyday life, is confirmation of the proposition that some mental 
disorder labels may function as extralegal variables. This proposition is supported by 
the quantitative findings in this study. The mental disorder label assigned to the 
victim had an impact on jurors' perception of the likeability, reliability and honesty of 
the victim, the responsibility for the crime and the guilt of the defendant, often 
interacting with juror gender and deliberation. However, no clear pattern of bias 
against or in favour of any specific victim was established this study. There was 
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slightly more evidence of a negative bias than a positive bias towards the control 
group and schizophrenia victims, while the opposite was true for the depression and 
intellectual disability victims. 
In conclusion, this study indicated that a mental disorder label, juror gender 
and the deliberation process influence juror's perceptions and decisions, in the 
instance of the crime of rape. 
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Appendix B 
Transcript of Videotape 
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A brief introduction to the court case will appear on each version of the videotape to 
once again prime the participants for the race of the victim: 
'You are about to watch the re-enactment of a court case regarding the attempted rape 
of a young woman suffering from (schizophrenia/depression/intellectual 
disability/control) which occurred in June 2000. To protect their anonymity, actors 
and actresses will play the roles of all involved.' 
Cast and Characters: 
1. Judge Costello 
2. Prosecutor, Mr Allen 
3. Barrister, Ms Stedman 
4. The Accused, Mark Smith 
5. Eyewitness, Andrew White 
6. Flatmate, Daniel Taylor 
7. Policeman, Sergeant Michelle Howard 
8. Clerk 
9.The Complainant, Anna Mitchell 
Setting: 
The transcript was filmed in the original Supreme Courthouse - The Francis Burt 
Law Education Centre and Museum, on Wednesday, 23rd April 2002. It was edited 
into four versions, the only difference between each version being the introductory 
statement describing the race of the victim, as shown above. 
Transcript 
Clerk: 
Calling case number 524 to session. The people vs. Mark Smith. All rise for the 
honourable Judge Costello. 
Judge: 
The court is now in session. 
Clerk: 
You may be seated. 
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Judge: 
The charges brought against the accused, Mark Smith, are that of the Attempted Rape 
of the complainant on the night of June 251h 2000. How does the accused plead? 
The Accused: 
Not guilty. 
Barrister: 
He pleads not guilty, your honour. 
Judge: 
Would the prosecution care to make their opening remarks? 
Prosecution: 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, we are here today to seek justice for the 
complainant, who was attacked and almost raped. When leaving her place of work 
late on June 25th, her car broke down, forcing her to look for the nearest telephone 
from which she could call for help. As she walked past a nearby park, she was 
grabbed and dragged into bushes where she was thrown onto the ground. As she was 
held against her will, her clothes were ripped from her body and her arms violently 
pinned to the ground. Frightened for her life, she fought back against her attacker, but 
was overpowered. Luckily, a man walking his dog nearby overheard a scuffle and 
disturbed what appeared to be a rape! Unfortunately, the attacker was able to escape, 
but as you will see - the accused not only fits the description of the attacker, he lives 
within minutes of the park and his watch was found at the crime scene. Today you 
will hear that he was not the attempted rapist - so listen carefully to the testimony, as 
you must be sure that the person responsible for this act will be punished, and justice 
will prevail. 
Judge: 
Defense, would you now care to make your opening remarks? 
Barrister: 
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Mark Smith has been wrongly accused of this 
crime. During the proceedings, I will demonstrate that this is not only a case of 
mistaken identity, but that there is no substantial evidence to prove that Mr Smith 
was even present at the scene of the crime and that he has a solid alibi that places him 
at home when the alleged crime occurred. In addition, there is no physical evidence 
that ties Mr Smith to this act and the finding of his watch at the crime scene does not 
indicate he was there as it was stolen several weeks before the alleged crime 
occurred. It is up to you to make sure that this innocent man is not wrongly 
convicted. 
Judge: 
Thank you. Were there any exhibits to be entered into the trial? 
Prosecution: 
Your honour, Ms Stedman and myself have agreed that the map of Gwelup Reserve 
from the Stirling City Council will be handed in as Exhibit A, and that this watch 
found at the alleged crime scene be entered as Exhibit B. 
Judge: 
Does the defense agree to this? 
Barrister: 
The defense agrees. 
Judge: 
Very well, hand them forward please.' (Prosecution gives the exhibits to the clerk). 
Would the prosecution please call their first witness? 
Prosecution: 
Your honour, the people call the complainant, Miss Anna Mitchell. 
Clerk: 
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Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I do. 
Judge: 
State your name. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Anna Mitchell. 
Judge: 
Be seated please. 
Prosecution: 
I know this may be very hard for you, but please tell the court in your own words 
what happened on the night of June 25th 2000. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I left work a little bit late because it was really busy ... 
Prosecution: 
What time was this? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I was supposed to knock off work at 7pm, but I left at about 7 .35pm. 
Prosecution: 
Where do you work? 
Anna Mitchell: 
At Villa Bianchi, it's a cafe on Scarborough Beach. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
And I got into my car and I started driving home. 
Prosecution: 
Where is home? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I live on Main Street in Balcatta, so it's about a IO-minute drive from work. 
Prosecution: 
And who lives with you? 
Anna Mitchell: 
136 
I live by myself. I moved out of home when I got my full-time job at the cafe about a 
year ago. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
So I was driving and then all of a sudden it made this strange noise and broke down. 
Prosecution: 
Where did this take place? 
Anna Mitchell: 
On Karrinyup Road in Gwelup. 
Prosecution: 
Can you be more precise? 
Anna Mitchell: 
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Well, I was on Karrinyup Road heading away from the coast - so I was heading 
east. .. and I'd just passed Huntriss Road when I broke down. So I was on Karrinyup 
Road, I'd say about 50 metres or less from the Huntriss intersection. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. What happened next? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I was worried. I didn't know what to do because I don't know anything about cars 
and I didn't have a mobile so I couldn't call anyone for help, and no one was around. 
Prosecution: 
So what time was it at this stage? 
Anna Mitchell: 
It was 7 .50pm. I remember looking at my watch when I broke down to see how late it 
was. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
I knew that there was a phone box nearby .... so I. .. 
Prosecution: 
Where was the phone box? 
Anna Mitchell: 
The nearest phone box that I knew of is on Karrinyup Road at this petrol station on 
the comer - I think the street is North Beach Rd. It was probably only a ten-minute 
walk on the same side of the road. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
So I decided to walk to the phone box so I could call the RAC. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I had just started walking and I was going past this park 
Prosecution: 
Which park was that? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Its called Gwelup Reserve. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
And then all of a sudden, I felt someone grab me from behind ......... and he pulled 
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me into the bushes and threw me on the ground .. . and I tried to scream but his hand 
was over my mouth. I was so scared and I kept thinking, he was going to kill me and 
that I shouldn' t have left my car! 
Prosecution: 
You say he grabbed you from behind and then threw you onto the ground - did you 
see the person who grabbed you? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes, I saw him. 
Prosecution: 
Could you describe what he looked like? 
Anna Mitchell: 
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He was wearing dark tracksuit pants and a burgundy top but I couldn' t properly make 
out his face. 
Prosecution: 
Could you describe his body - whether he was tall/short, his type of build and so 
forth? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well, he was so strong. He was a really big built man and really tall too, at least 6 
foot, possible a bit taller. 
Prosecution: 
Do you see anybody in court that resembles the attacker? 
Anna Mitchell: 
The attacker was about the size that the accused is. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue - you said he threw you on the ground. 
Anna Mitchell: 
He threw me down and then he climbed on top of me and started tearing at my blouse 
and I was trying to stop him but he was so strong (voice starts to break, and puts 
hand over eyes and looks down) and he pinned my arms above my head, and I 
couldn't move . .. ' 
Prosecution: 
Please continue ... I know this is hard. 
Anna Mitchell: 
I tried to scream but he shoved something in my mouth, I think it was a sock or 
something and .. . 
Prosecution: 
Please continue 
Anna Mitchell: 
(Starts to cry) He starting pulling at my skirt and I was so frightened and there was 
nothing I could do! 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
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Well, we were struggling, and he was holding my arms against the ground above my 
head and fumbling around with his other hand near his pants and I was trying to spit 
our the thing in my mouth and I couldn't. .. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well, we were struggling and wrestling and then I could feel his erect penis pushing 
against my leg and . .. 
Prosecution: 
And? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I was struggling so much but it was no use, he was so strong and there was nothing I 
could do (starts to cry more) He was trying to move my legs apart with his knees and 
pushing at them, and . .. .  
Prosecution: 
Please continue, what happened next? 
Anna Mitchell: 
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Well, next thing I knew - I heard this dog barking in the background and all of 
sudden this man was there, and he yelled out 'Hey what's going on here?' and then 
the attacker who was trying to rape me got up and ran off. 
Prosecution: 
And then what happened? 
Anna Mitchell: 
The man who had yelled asked if I was okay and helped me up, and I couldn't talk . . .  
Prosecution: 
What happened to the gag? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I must have pulled it out when he ran off - I can't really remember how it all 
happened . .. 
Prosecution: 
Do you remember where the gag went? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I can't remember - I was struggling to get to my feet and I think I just pulled it out 
and dropped it. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I was crying and couldn't talk. Then the man said we should go to the police, 
but I was so scared and I couldn't stop crying, and I just wanted to go home. He told 
me not to be scared and that he would drive me home. 
Prosecution: 
Carry on. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I told him where I lived and he drove me home and he gave me his phone 
number and said that if I needed to contact him then he could help me. 
Prosecution: 
And what did you do once you got home? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I felt disgusting and dirty and awful and I just wanted to . .. to .... just feel better 
somehow. I ran a really hot bath and I soaked for so long, it must have been hours. 
Prosecution: 
Did you have any bruises or cuts? 
Anna Mitchell: 
We had been wrestling a lot and I had a couple of small bruises on my arms and 
wrists, and a couple on my legs too. 
Prosecution: 
Did your require any medical treatment? 
Anna Mitchell: 
No. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. What happened next? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I went to bed. 
Prosecution: 
What happened to your clothes? 
Anna Mitchell: 
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I threw them in the rubbish bin outside my house. I just didn't want them anywhere 
near me and I didn't ever want to wear them again. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well I had a rostered day off work and I just spent the day at home. 
Prosecution: 
What did you do? 
Anna Mitchell: 
I tried to keep myself busy so I wouldn't think about it. I was just so upset and 
needed to distract myself. So I cleaned the bathroom, the living room ... the 
kitchen . .. and I called the RAC to pick up my car. 
Prosecution: 
Did you report the attack to the police? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
And when did you do this? 
Anna Mitchell: 
About 2 weeks later. 
Prosecution: 
Why did you wait 2 weeks? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well, my parents don't like me living alone and I didn't want them to find our what 
had happened. 
Prosecution: 
So what made you report the attack? 
Anna Mitchell: 
About 2 weeks after the attack, I confided in my best friend and she convinced me 
that I couldn't let the man get away with what he had done to me - so I called the 
police and I told them what had happened. 
Prosecution: 
What happened next? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Well the police took my statement and then I showed them where I was attacked at 
the park. 
Prosecution: 
Who was the police officer that accompanied you? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Her name was Sergeant Howard. 
Prosecution: (gets map off clerk) 
I have with me Exhibit A, which is a map of the park Gwelup Reserve. (Holds up 
map and unfolds it in front of the witness). Does this resemble the place you were 
attacked? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes it does. 
Prosecution: 
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Looking at this map can you point out to me the exact place that you were attacked? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Just here. (points to area CS) 
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Prosecution: 
I see. Let the record show that by using the grid on the border of the map, the 
complainant pointed to area C5. Did they find anything at the place where you were 
attacked? (returns map to the clerk). 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes, they found a watch. 
Prosecution: 
Did you see them find the watch? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes, I did. Sergeant Howard yelled out 'Look at this' and held it up. 
Prosecution: 
Thank you. No more questions your honour. 
Barrister: 
Miss Mitchell, you testified that your car broke down at 7.50pm the night you were 
allegedly attacked. Is this correct? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes it is. 
Barrister: 
Now, June 251h as we all know is in the middle of winter. Can you tell me what the 
weather was like that night? Was it overcast or was there a clear sky? 
Anna Mitchell: 
It was heavily overcast. It had been raining when I was at the cafe. 
Barrister: 
Had it stopped raining when your car broke down? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes. 
Barrister: 
So I'm assuming that at 7 .50pm in the middle of winter - on a rainy night with a 
heavily overcast sky that it was also very dark. Is this correct? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes, It was quite dark. 
Barrister: 
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Just before you were allegedly grabbed and pulled into the bushes by the attacker­
can you tell me if there were any streetlights where you were walking, or whether any 
cars were passing? 
Anna Mitchell: 
The street was very quiet and there were no cars. There were some streetlights, but 
overall the street wasn't very well-lit, I think the nearest street light was probably 
several metres away - possibly 6 or 7. 
Barrister: 
You testified that you were pulled into some bushes in the park. Were there any lights 
in the park? 
Anna Mitchell: 
No, it was quite dark. 
Barrister: 
In this dark light, can you be sure that the attacker is the man accused of this crime? 
Anna Mitchell: 
No, I can't be certain because it was dark. But it looks like him. 
Barrister: 
It looks like him? But you testified that you could not identify him! 
Anna Mitchell: 
But.. . 
Barrister: 
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Remembering that it was dark, and that many men fit this description - is it possible 
that the accused is not the attacker, but that the attacker is another man? 
Anna Mitchell: 
Yes, I guess so. 
Barrister: 
No further questions your honour. 
Judge: 
Does the prosecution wish to re-examine? 
Prosecution: 
No, your honour. 
Judge: 
Very well, would the prosecution care to call their next witness? 
Prosecution: 
Your honour, the people call Mr Andrew White. 
Clerk: 
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
Mr White: 
I do. 
Judge: 
State your name. 
Mr White: 
Andrew White. 
Judge: 
Be seated please. 
Prosecution: 
Mr White, what were you doing on the night of June 251\ 2000? 
Mr White: 
I was walking my dog. 
Prosecution: 
What time was this? 
Mr White: 
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Well after tea which was around 7 .30pm, I drove to the park . . . .  so it would have been 
about 7.40 pm by the time I got ready and began walking. 
Prosecution: 
Where do you live? 
Mr White: 
In Innaloo - which is quite close, I'd say no more than 3-5 minutes drive to the park. 
Prosecution: 
And which park is this? 
Mr White: 
It's a large park named Gwelup Reserve. It's on Karrinyup Road. 
Prosecution 
Tell me in your own words what happened as you walked your dog by Gwelup 
Reserve that night. 
Mr White: 
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Well, I had been walking Bailey for about 15 minutes at this time, and as we neared 
the park I leaned down to take his leash off so he could have a quick run around the 
park. 
Prosecution 
So this would have been around 8pm now, adding 15 minutes to the time that you 
began walking? Could that be correct? 
Mr White: 
Yes, it was almost 8pm. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Mr White: 
As we ran around the park, we neared some bushes where I heard some noises, kind 
of like a scuffle, which I thought, was some animals or something. 
Prosecution 
What happened next? 
Mr White: 
Well I jogged over to the bushes to see what the noise was, and I saw the woman . . . .  
Anna. 
Prosecution: 
Do you see the woman in court? 
Mr White: 
Yes, she is sitting in the back of the courtroom dressed in a red top and black pants. 
Prosecution: 
Let the record show that the witness identified the complainant as the woman he saw 
that night. (gets map off the clerk). 
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I have with me a map of Gwelup Reserve (pulls out map and holds in front of Mr 
White) and surrounding streets. Could you please point out to me exactly where these 
bushes were? 
Mr White: 
Sure - it was about here. (points to same spot on map as Anna) 
Prosecution: 
I see. Let the record show that the witness identified C5 as the area in which he saw 
the complainant being attacked. (returns map to the clerk). Please continue Mr. 
White - can you describe what you saw? 
Mr White: 
Well there was this man on top of her struggling with her, and I could see that her 
clothes were ripped, and I yelled out 'hey!' and the man jumped up really quickly and 
ran off. 
Prosecution: 
What did the man look like? 
Mr White: 
He was really tall, about 6 ft 2, with a large build. 
Prosecution: 
Do you see a similar person in court? 
Mr White: 
Yes, he looked like the accused, but I cannot say that it was him. 
Prosecution: 
And did you see what he was wearing? 
Mr White: 
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He was wearing dark pants, I think they were jeans . . .  and a darkish top, maybe dark 
blue or black. 
Prosecution: 
Ok, so he was wearing dark pants and a dark top - and then he ran away. Then what 
happened? 
Mr White: 
I helped her up and she was crying. 
Prosecution: 
Who did you help up? 
Mr White: 
The complainant. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue. 
Mr White: 
I asked her what had happened but she was crying too much and didn't answer me. I 
told her I would help her and not to be scared, but that we should go to the police 
because I could see that the man had ripped her clothes and I thought that he had 
been trying to rape her. 
Prosecution 
Why did you think he was trying to rape her? 
Mr White: 
When I approached them, she was fighting with him and she was crying. Her clothes 
were all tom and she looked scared. 
Prosecution 
Then what did you do? 
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Mr White: 
She said she wanted to go home but her car had broken down. I told her I would drive 
her and I helped her to my car. Then I drove her home. 
Prosecution 
What happened next? 
Mr White: 
Well, she was a mess, and I asked her if she was going to be alright and if she had 
someone who was staying with her - you know, someone she could talk to. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Mr White: 
She said she lived alone but that she would be alright and that she just wanted to 
clean herself up. 
Prosecution: 
And then what happened? 
Mr White: 
She got out and was walking to the house, and I got out and ran up to her and gave 
her my business card and told her to call me if she needed a witness. She said thank 
you, and went inside the house. 
Prosecution 
Then what happened? 
Mr White: 
Well, I got in my car and I went home. I didn't hear from her until about 2 weeks 
later when she called me, 
Prosecution: 
Who called you? 
Mr White: 
The complainant. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue. 
Mr White: 
Well she rang me up and asked me if I would help her. 
Prosecution 
What did she say? 
Mr White: 
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She told me that she didn't want to do anything at first because she was frightened 
and didn' t want people to know what had happened. But she said after speaking with 
her best friend that she wanted to get the man who attacked her. 
Prosecution 
Continue. 
Mr White: 
Well, she said she'd talked to the police and they wanted me to come in and make a 
statement. So I went in, made my statement and gave a description of the attacker. 
Prosecution: 
No more questions. 
Barrister: 
Mr White, you testified that you took your dog for a walk that evening? Do you walk 
your dog every night? 
Mr White: 
Most nights. 
Barrister: 
And what do you usually take with you on your walks? 
Mr White: 
Well . .. a leash for the dog, sometimes a jumper depending on how cold it is, that' s 
pretty much it. 
Barrister: 
So you never take a torch? 
Mr White: 
Uh, no. 
Barrister: 
You testified that you were walking your dog on the night of June 25th at 
approximately 7.45/8pm, is this correct? 
Mr White: 
Yes. 
Barrister: 
That' s interesting. Tell me, can you tell me what the weather was like that night? 
Mr White: 
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It was pretty wet. It had been raining earlier and was quite overcast. I was wearing a 
raincoat. 
Barrister: 
So I'm assuming that it was quite a dark night then? 
Mr White: 
Yes it was. 
Barrister: 
Tell me about the lighting in the park? 
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Mr White: 
There were not many streetlights, but I could see where I was going. I know the park 
well. 
Barrister: 
Would you say then Mr White, that it was quite dark at the park that night? 
Mr White: 
Yes, I would. 
Barrister: 
So can you tell the court how close you were to the attacker when you came across 
him and Miss Mitchell in the bushes? 
Mr White: 
I was about 3 metres away 
Barrister: 
And of what colour top did you say the attacker was wearing? 
Mr White: 
I'm not sure, it was a dark top though. 
Barrister: 
In other words, it was too hard to see wasn't it Mr White 
Mr White: 
Yes, I guess it was. 
Barrister: 
So in your testimony, you mentioned that the attacker ran off quickly once you 
arrived. 
Mr White: 
Yes he did. 
156 
Barrister: 
(places same map in front of witness) - Here is the map again - can you point out to 
the court where you were and which way you were facing. 
Mr White: 
I was here and I was facing this way. (points north). 
Barrister: 
And can you show the court which way he ran off? 
Mr White: 
He ran away from me. I was here and he ran this way. (points south). 
Barrister: 
In other words, you saw him from behind. Is that correct? 
Mr White: 
Yes. 
Barrister: 
So can you tell the court what his face looked like, for example the colour of his eyes 
or any distinguishing facial features? 
Mr White: 
No, I can't - I didn't see his face. 
Barrister: 
So we've established that it was dark, you are unsure of the colour of his clothes, and 
you didn't even seen his face. 
Mr White: 
Yes. 
Barrister: 
So you' re not really sure that the accused is the man who attacked the complainant 
that night are you? 
Mr White: 
Well, no I can't be certain. 
Barrister: 
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Mr White, my client will testify that he is not the attacker. Do you have anything to 
comment about that? 
Mr White: 
No. 
Barrister: 
No more questions. 
Judge: 
Does the prosecution wish to re-examine? 
Prosecution: 
No your honour. 
Judge: 
Would the prosecution care to call their next witness? 
Prosecution: 
Your honour, the people call Sergeant Michelle Howard 
Clerk: 
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
Sergeant Howard: 
I do. 
Judge: 
State your name and rank. 
Sergeant Howard: 
Sergeant Michelle Howard from Scarborough Police station. 
Judge: 
Please be seated. 
Prosecution: 
How many years have you been in service Sergeant? 
Sergeant Howard: 
27 this year. 
Prosecution: 
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Can you please tell the courtroom in your own words about your involvement in this 
case? 
Sergeant Howard: 
Of course. I was assigned to this case when a call was made to the department on the 
3rd of July by a woman claiming to have been attacked. 
Prosecution: 
Who was the lady in question? 
Sergeant Howard: 
It was Anna Mitchell. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Sergeant Howard: 
She called and claimed 2 weeks earlier on the night of June 25th a man had tried to 
rape her. 
Prosecution: 
Did you take her call? 
Sergeant Howard: 
Yes, the call was put through to me. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Sergeant Howard: 
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I asked her to come in to make a formal statement which she did that afternoon, the 
3rd of July. After I had gathered some information, I asked her to take me to the 
scene of the alleged crime, which was Gwelup Reserve. When we got to the park, 
she showed me where she was attacked. 
Prosecution: (gets map off the clerk) 
Here is a map of the park. Could you please point out where the crime scene was? 
Sergeant Howard: 
Just here. (points to area CS). 
Prosecution: 
Let the record show that the witness also identified CS as the area as the crime scene. 
Please continue, what happened next? (returns map to the clerk). 
Sergeant Howard: 
Upon looking at the crime scene - I discovered a man's watch with a broken band, 
and an inscription and stamp on it, 
Prosecution: 
Do you have a photograph of the watch? 
Sergeant Howard: 
Unfortunately not. It was an extremely busy day and the photographer was unable to 
make it to the park. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue. 
Sergeant Howard: 
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We collected the watch but unfortunately as 2 weeks had passed, we were unable to 
find any forensic evidence. 
Prosecution: 
What did the inscription and stamp say? 
Sergeant Howard: 
It said 'M.Smith, Graduation, 1995,' and the stamp had the name of a shop, Tom's 
Jewelers. 
Prosecution: 
And then what happened? 
Sergeant Howard: 
We went to Tom's Jewelers and I talked to the manger who showed me the records of 
sales. I was able to determine the name and address of the buyer, which was Melanie 
Smith. Upon calling her, I determined that the watch had been purchased for her son, 
Mark for his graduation some years ago. 
Prosecution: 
And what happened next? 
Sergeant Howard: 
I contacted Mark Smith that same day on July 3rd - and asked if he would come in for 
questioning with regard to the finding of his watch at the crime scene. He came in 
that afternoon and was questioned. Upon seeing the watch, he said that it was his and 
that it had been stolen at a football game around a month earlier. 
Prosecution: 
Was a police report filed with regard to the theft of his watch? 
Sergeant Howard: 
No, it was not. 
Prosecution: 
Please continue. 
Sergeant Howard: 
He further claimed that on the night of the attack he was at home. Upon being 
advised that he was a suspect in the attempted rape of Miss Mitchell, he became 
angry and refused to make a statement, upon which he was formally charged. 
Prosecution: 
Was anyone else interviewed with regards to this case? 
Sergeant Howard: 
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Yes, we also interviewed the previous witness, Andrew White with regards to the 25th 
June. He gave a description of the attacker but a lineup was not worthwhile as his 
description was only of the size and build of the attacker. 
Prosecution: 
Finally, you mentioned that the watch, which was identified by Mark Smith as being 
his own, also had a broken band. (Gets watch off the clerk). 
Here is the watch, labeled as Exhibit B (holds up watch in plastic bag). Can you tell 
us about the nature of the break? 
Sergeant Howard: 
Well, no one can be sure of how it broke, but it appears to have been snapped. 
Prosecution: 
(Returns watch to the clerk) As if someone had been wrestling with another? 
Sergeant Howard: 
It's possible. 
Prosecution: 
Can you tell me Sergeant where the accused lives? 
Sergeant Howard: 
He reported to me that he lives in Karrinyup, on Taunton Way. 
Prosecution: 
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Approximately how far from the crime scene, which is Gwelup Reserve - is Taunton 
Way? 
Sergeant Howard: 
It's very close, I'd say approximately 1.2 kilometres. 
Prosecution: 
So approximately how long would it take to drive or walk there? 
Sergeant Howard: 
I'd say no more than a 10-minute walk, and in the car, well only a few minutes. 
Prosecution: 
Thank you, no more questions your honour. 
Judge: 
Does the prosecution have any more witnesses? 
Prosecution: 
No, your honour. The prosecution is closing its case. 
Judge: 
Defense, would you like to call your first witness? 
Barrister: 
Your honour, the defense calls Mr Mark Smith. 
Clerk: 
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Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
god? 
Mark Smith: 
I do. 
Judge: 
State your name. 
Mark Smith: 
Mark Smith. 
Judge: 
Be seated please. 
Barrister: 
Mark Smith, could you please tell the court where you were on the night of June 25th 
2000? 
Mark Smith: 
Sure, I was at home watching television. 
Barrister: 
What program were you watching? 
Mark Smith: 
I was flipping between the channels, mainly watching 60 minutes. 
Barrister: 
What time was this? 
Mark Smith: 
Around 7 .30, 8pm. 
Barrister: 
Is there anyone who can testify that you were home that night? 
Mark Smith: 
Yes there is. My roommate, Daniel Taylor was also at home. 
Barrister: 
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Lets clear something else up. The court has also heard that your watch was found at 
the crime scene. How do you explain this? 
Mark Smith: 
Well I had been playing football at Gwelup Reserve several weeks earlier. 
Barrister: 
Could you be more specific? Do you have an exact date and time? 
Mark Smith: 
It was Saturday, the 2ih of May. We were playing most of the afternoon. But I think 
we probably began playing around lunch and finished around 4 or 5pm. 
Barrister: 
Continue. What happened while you were playing football? 
Mark Smith: 
Well - before we began playing, I removed my watch and put it into the pocket of my 
jacket, which I took off. When we had finished playing, I noticed that my jacket had 
been stolen. I have not seen my watch or my jacket since. 
Barrister: 
And is there anyone who can confirm that you were playing football at Gwelup 
Reserve on the 27th of May? 
Mark Smith: 
Yes, Daniel was playing football with me. 
Barrister: 
No more questions your honour. 
Prosecution: 
(gets watch off the clerk) - Mark Smith, this is Exhibit B, the watch found at the 
crime scene at which Miss Mitchell was attacked. Can you identify this watch? 
(shows watch). 
Mark Smith: 
Yes, it is my watch. 
Prosecution: 
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(gives the watch back to the clerk) - We have just heard your testimony that your 
watch was stolen some weeks ago. Do you have any proof that your watch was stolen 
along with your jacket? 
Mark Smith: 
No I don't. I didn't see who took it and none of my friends did either. 
Prosecution: 
Sergeant Howard testified that no police report was filed with regards to the theft of 
your watch. Can you explain this? 
Mark Smith: 
Well, I didn't think to report it, it wasn't a big deal. 
Prosecution: 
That appears to be an awfully convenient explanation for the placement of your 
watch at the crime scene doesn't it? 
Mark Smith: 
Maybe, but it is what happened. 
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Prosecution: 
Sergeant Howard also mentioned that the watchband was also broken, can you tell us 
anything about this? 
Mark Smith: 
Well, it wasn't broken when I took it off to play football. 
Prosecution: 
Well perhaps it was broken in a struggle then. 
Mark Smith: 
Maybe. 
Prosecution: 
Lets move on. How far away is Gwelup Reserve from your home? 
Mark Smith: 
It' s  about 4 streets away. 
Prosecution: 
Ok, so how long would it take you to drive there? 
Mark Smith: 
A minute or two. 
Prosecution: 
And walk? 
Mark Smith: 
I don' t know, I guess about 5 to 10 minutes? 
Prosecution: 
So you could quite easily have walked to the park and tried to rape Miss Mitchell 
couldn't you? 
Mark Smith: 
Yes, but I didn't !  
Prosecution: 
Mark Smith - you testified that Daniel was home with you on the night that Miss 
Mitchell was attacked. 
Mark Smith: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
Did anyone of you make coffee that night? 
Mark Smith: 
No. 
Prosecution: 
Did you communicate at all? 
Mark Smith: 
I really can't remember - maybe. 
Prosecution: 
What was Daniel doing that night? 
Mark Smith: 
He was watching a video. 
Prosecution: 
What video was it? 
Mark Smith: 
I can't really remember - I think it was The Terminator. 
Prosecution: 
No further questions your honour. 
Judge: 
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Does the defense wish to re-examine? 
Barrister: 
No your honour. 
Judge: 
Defense, would you like to call your next witness? 
Barrister: 
Your honour, the defense calls Mr Daniel Taylor. 
Clerk: 
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Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you 
God? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I do. 
Judge: 
State your name. 
Daniel Taylor: 
Daniel Taylor. 
Judge: 
Please be seated. 
Barrister: 
Mr Taylor, could you please explain to the court your relationship to the accused? 
Daniel Taylor: 
He's my roommate. We have been living in the same apartment for about 18 months 
now. 
Barrister: 
I see, and where were you on the night of the 25th June 2000? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I was at home. 
Barrister: 
And what time did you first arrive home? 
Daniel Taylor: 
After work, about 6pm. 
Barrister: 
I see, and was anyone else home when you arrived? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes, Mark was home too. He usually gets home a bit earlier than me. 
Barrister: 
What was Mark doing when you got home? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Watching television. 
Barrister: 
What was he watching? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I can't really remember. 
Barrister: 
Tell me, did you, at any period, leave the house that night? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No I did not. 
Barrister: 
And did Mark leave the house that night? 
Daniel Taylor: 
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No he did not. 
Barrister: 
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So, on the night of the attack on Ms Mitchell, Mark Smith was at home with you, is 
this correct? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes it is. 
Barrister: 
Can you also tell us if you have played football recently with Mark Smith? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes, we played a few weeks back at Gwelup Reserve. 
Barrister: 
What date was this? 
Daniel Taylor: 
It was the 2ih of May, a Saturday. 
Barrister: 
(Gets watch off the clerk) - Here is a watch (brings bag to Daniel). Can you identify 
who is belongs to? 
Daniel Taylor: 
It looks like Mark's watch. 
Barrister: 
Can you tell the court when you last saw the watch? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I can' t remember an exact date - but it was a while ago. I'd say at least a month. 
Barrister: 
Mark stated that his watch was stolen that day. Can you confirm this? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes, I do recall him saying that he had lost his watch. 
Barrister: 
No more questions your honour. 
Prosecution: 
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Mr Taylor - I'd like you to describe for me in detail what the layout of your house is. 
Daniel Taylor: 
Well, as you walk in the front door, we have a large open area. The kitchen and table 
are on your left and to the right is the lounge area, where we have our television and 
couches. 
Prosecution: 
Continue. 
Daniel Taylor: 
Further down, we have our two bedrooms and behind these is the bathroom and the 
laundry. 
Prosecution: 
So there is only one door? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
And the only walls are the ones surrounding the apartment itself, and those that 
section off the bedrooms and the laundry? Is this correct? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
I see. Mr Taylor, when you arrived home where was Mark? 
Daniel Taylor: 
He was in the lounge room watching television. 
Prosecution: 
And tell me what else happened that night? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I made tea, served up some extra for Mark and went to my room. 
Prosecution: 
Did either of you make coffee that night? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No, I don't think we did, I can't remember. 
Prosecution: 
Did you talk to Mark during the course of the evening? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I don't know. I can't remember. 
Prosecution: 
So what did you do once you went to your room that night? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I watched a video. 
Prosecution: 
What video did you watch? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Mission Impossible. 
Prosecution: 
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Are you sure that it was Mission Impossible that you watched? And not The 
Terminator? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes, I am sure. 
Prosecution: 
So you watched Mission Impossible in YOUR room? 
Daniel Taylor: 
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Yes, because Mark was watching a television program and didn't  want to watch my 
video. 
Prosecution: 
And what time did you put on the video? 
Daniel Taylor: 
At 7 .30pm I think, I can't  be sure of the exact time, but it was around then. 
Prosecution: 
And how long did the video go for? 
Daniel Taylor: 
About two hours. 
Prosecution: 
So from approximately 7 .30 to 9.30pm you were in your room watching a video, is 
this correct? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
And was your bedroom door open or closed while you watched the video? 
Daniel Taylor: 
It was closed. 
Prosecution: 
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Did you at any time while watching the video venture out of your room to any other 
room of the house, say to the lounge room or the toilet? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No, I watched it from start to finish. 
Prosecution: 
And when the video finished what did you do? 
Daniel Taylor: 
I got a glass of water from the kitchen and went to bed. 
Prosecution: 
And did you see Mark as you went to the kitchen? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No, all the lights had been switched off, so I figured he had gone to bed. 
Prosecution: 
Did you check his bedroom to see if this was true? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No, of course not. 
Prosecution: 
I see, so for two hours between 7.30 and 9.30pm you were busy in your room 
watching a video and you did not leave the room once. 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes. 
Prosecution: 
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And is it possible Mr Taylor, due to your description of the house - that Mark could 
have left the house without you knowing? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Yes he could have, but he would have told me if he was going out. 
Prosecution: 
But how can you be certain that he did in fact stay home? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Well I can't. 
Prosecution: 
Is it possible Mr Taylor, that Mark did in fact leave the house around 7.30pm and 
return before or even after you finished watching your video and you did not know? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Of course its possible but. .. 
Prosecution: 
(interrupts) That' s all we need to hear Mr Taylor. I think we've confirmed that Mr 
Smith's alibi is questionable to say the least. Lets talk about this watch that 
apparently was stolen. Did you see Mark wearing that watch before you started 
playing football that day at the park? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No, I didn't notice. 
Prosecution: 
So when did Mark tell you that his watch had been stolen and where did he say it had 
been stolen from? 
Daniel Taylor: 
A couple of weeks after we played football he told me that he had lost it that day. 
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Prosecution: 
So, you really do not know for sure that Mark was even wearing the watch that day. 
For all you know, Mark may not even have taken his watch to the park that day and 
had it stolen, for all you know, Mark may have worn that watch a couple of weeks 
later and had it ripped off by Miss Mitchell when he attacked her. .. which is why it 
was found at the park . . .  
Daniel Taylor: 
Well . .. 
Prosecution: 
So you cannot answer that? 
Daniel Taylor: 
No. 
Prosecution: 
No more questions your honour. 
Judge: 
Does the defense wish to re-examine the witness? 
Defense: 
Yes, your honour. Mr Taylor, when the prosecution asked you if it was possible that 
Mark left the house and you were unaware, he interrupted you. What was it that you 
wanted to say? 
Daniel Taylor: 
Well, I cannot be sure but Mark would have told me if he was leaving. 
Defense: 
Thank you. No more questions your honour. 
Judge: 
Are there any more witnesses? 
Barrister: 
No your honour. The defense closes its case. 
Judge: 
Very well, we'll hear your final remarks after a short recess. 
FADE OUT AND THEN IN TO DEMONSTRATE PASSED TIME. 
Prosecution: 
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Ladies and Gentleman, you have just heard the testimony of several witnesses, the 
complainant and the accused. The defense would like you to believe that is just a 
form of mistaken identity and that Mark Smith was at home at the time of the 
attempted rape of Miss Mitchell. However, not only does the description of the 
attacker from both Miss Mitchell and Andrew White match that of the accused, but 
his alibi is highly questionable. His roommate is not even certain that he was indeed 
home - in fact as he lives only minutes away from the park where Miss Mitchell was 
attacked, he could quite easily have walked there and back and attacked her within a 
short period of time!! Not only this, but Mark Smith's watch was also found at the 
� of the crime. Listen to the facts of the case as they stand before you as it is up 
to you to convict this man so that he won' t attack any more women. 
Barrister: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, many men live in the same street as Mr. Smith -
not to mention the other streets surrounding Gwelup Park, also giving them ample 
opportunity to attack the complainant. His address should not convince you that he is 
the attacker, because as we all know - people who attack others do not have to be on 
foot, they may also have access to vehicles, meaning a number of people in 
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surrounding areas would also have the opportunity to attack Miss Mitchell! Mr. 
Smith may fit the very brief description given by the two witnesses, but lets not 
forget that it was very dark in the bushes and one witness only saw the attacker from 
behind as he ran away. Hardly enough time to form an accurate description. How 
can they be sure that it was actually Mr Smith they saw and not someone else? In 
addition to this, there is absolutely no physical evidence that ties Mr. Smith to the 
crime. The fact that his watch was found at the scene of the crime does nothing but 
tell us that the thief had also been at the bushes since the watch was stolen. There is 
no real evidence against Mr Smith. Don't convict an innocent man. PICTURE TO 
FADE. 
